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Since NASCAR driver Ken Schrader’s victory at the track’s christening on June
21, 1997, Auto Club Speedway has housed up to 92,000 Californians eager to watch steel
hurtle around the track at over 150 miles per hour.1 Located fifty miles east of downtown
Los Angeles in Fontana, the speedway, for most Angelenos, is no more than its Cherry
Street exit off of the I-10.2 But for Fontana, and those 92,000, the ground that the track
occupies has been, and still is, the lifeblood of their local economy. Today, steel swoops
by, into, and around the speedway in the form of cars, Japanese, American, and
European. Until 1983, the passage of steel about Fontana was far different. Rather than
shipped in as the backbone of cars raced around the speedway track at 150 miles per
hour, Fontana exported steel that was heated, molded, and shaped into the ships of the
United States of America’s Navy.
In 1942, the Fontana Daily Herald, referring to Henry Kaiser, founder of Kaiser
Permanente, read, “The ‘Miracle Man’ Comes to Fontana.”3 Up until that year, the west
coast lacked any large-scale steel plant.4 By December, the Kaiser Steel Mill in Fontana
had a running furnace.5 Five months later, steel began to ship out, headed towards
shipyards in Richmond and San Pedro where Kaiser had implemented unprecedented
manufacturing systems – churning out his Liberty Ships in mere days.6 The federal
government’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a New Deal hangover, provided the
initial loan necessary to pay for the plant. Angelenos perceived the plant as a key turning
point in ending western colonialism, adding a necessary raw material that would allow
1

“Looking Back: Key Dates,” The Press Enterprise, http://www.pe.com/sports/projects/2007/10years/#.
Using Union Station as a parameter for downtown Los Angeles throughout this thesis.
3
Qtd. in Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Vintage Books,
1992), 390.
4
Roger W. Lotchin, Fortress California 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 154.
5
Davis, City of Quartz, 392.
6
Davis, City of Quartz, 392.
2
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their factories to free themselves of the East.7 However, to see Fontana only from the
perspective of the Southland’s boosters ignores the plant’s power as a symbol of urban
and industrial transformations in the area.
Fontana, 50 miles away from Los Angeles’ center, fell in line with the metropolis’
tradition of urban decentralization. Boosters, reacting to fears about urban congestion in
the 1920s, combined arguments about industrial decentralization with further commercial
and urban growth for the city. During World War II, as more defense industry arrived in
the Southland, boosters on the periphery developed new urban hubs far away from
downtown. Fontana, alongside Palmdale, “the aerospace capital of the world,” best
characterize this phenomenon.8 The peripheral hubs depended on their respective
defense industries, steel in Fontana and aerospace in the Antelope Valley. The defense
industries served as Fontana and Palmdale’s tickets into the regional economy. When
those industries left or downsized, the two cities fell back into the periphery as fragile and
distant suburbs in search of new industry to underwrite any future prosperity.
Prior to World War II, Fontana was an agricultural town in San Bernardino
County. Just as steel embodied the industrial dreams of California, those rooted in
Keynes, the New Deal, and global conflict, agricultural Fontana represented other notions
of the California ideal. This first version, a local breed going back one hundred years
romanticized some of America’s greatest memories. In mixing this tradition with
twentieth century industrialization and consumerism, Los Angeles created a blend of
capitalism and culture that was proclaimed simultaneously the “First American City” and
the downfall of Jeffersonian Democracy. Mike Davis applied a Marxist framework to

7
8

Lotchin, Fortress California, 154-155.
http://www.cityofpalmdale.org/visitors/
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study the class warfare and political economy of Los Angeles. He wrote, “Fontana was
the modernized Jeffersonian idyll: an arcadian community of small chicken rancher and
citrus growers living self-sufficiently in their electrified bungalows.”9 Davis argues that
american capitalism, by means of the New Deal and Henry Kaiser, maligned these
humble beginnings and eventually led to Fontana the “junkyard.”10 While Davis’
framework provided a deep understanding of Los Angeles and how its culture was
influenced by capitalism, his criticisms of the system are misguided. American
capitalism did not destroy Fontana. Without capitalism, Fontana would have never
existed – its original boosters, A. B. Miller, was an agricultural entrepreneur that
envisioned a profitable community of farms where Fontana now lies. Rather, when
community leaders, in places around the country, but especially in Palmdale and Fontana,
implement their desires for local prosperity under the pretenses of misguided optimism,
they overlook the implications.
Fontana, located outside of the topographical boundaries of Los Angeles city and
county, was, from 1942 until its industrial demise, a peripheral cornerstone of the
regional manufacturing grid – decentralized and planned by local boosters. Along with
plants, airports, and runways pushing the Northern outer boundaries of Los Angeles into
the Mojave and Antelope Valley, Fontana’s industrial presence represented the stretching
of capitalism across the Southland’s campus. These trends were continuing and evolving
fears of urban centralization and crowding that developed among Los Angeles planners,
politicians, and businessmen during the 1920s. Loathing what they saw as the urban
squalor overtaking Eastern cities founded in pre-industrial eras, these figures looked

9

Davis, City of Quartz, 376.
Davis, City of Quartz, 373.
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outward – dispersing and segmenting industry and population. With these anxieties
internalized, the city experienced depression and then a war, in which the airplane was
paramount, which brought magnificent spoils in the form of defense contracts and
demand for manufacturing. As the city continued its outward growth, it grew into a
regional economic metropolis ever progressing forward and outwards. In 1949, Carey
McWilliams, a historian of the city and progressive booster, wrote, “The ‘spread-out’
character of Los Angeles has lent itself to a new type of industrial development, fitting in
with modern industrial methods.”11 Fontana, Edwards Air Force Base, and Palmdale
embody this new type of industrial development.
Roger W. Lotchin, an urban historian who wrote Fortress California 1910-1961:
From Warfare to Welfare, established the argument about boosterism that Fontana and
Palmdale represent on periphery. Rooted local boosters worked to advance their city, coopting the federal and defense spending during World War I, the New Deal, World War
II, and postwar prosperity to continue Southern California’s history of booms. The
“fragmented metropolis,” as Robert Fogelson calls it, is the result of the booster
movement’s work. Among other things, fears of industrial congestion, traffic, and
centralized population, spurred the boosters to segment the city and develop outward and
decentralized. The city’s early leaders sold decentralization in Los Angeles as its own
commodity. The economic decentralization, along with the city’s allegiance to the
automobile, established the “spatial fragmentation” of the city. Palmdale and Fontana
represent the next step of these arguments, a step the boosters made in partnership with
the military and defense related industries.

11

Carey Mcwilliams, California: The Great Exceptions, (Conneticut: Greenwood Press, 1949), 238.

Bargmann
The empirical arguments made by Fogelson, Lotchin, Davis, and others, fall in
line with the Los Angeles School of urban thought. Edward Soja, Michael Dear, Allen
Scott, and Davis, are significant scholars associated with the school. The school argues
for a postmodern or post-fordist understanding of the city.12 This framework is contrary
to the traditional Chicago School vision of a modern city built around a centralized
industrial core – as in New York or Chicago. Rather, with Los Angeles as the
paradigmatic example of the “postmetropolis,” the L.A. School suggests the current
generation of cities should be understood as regional sprawl both spatially and
economically – composed of urban peripheral hubs. Soja calls these “technopoles.”13
Both Fontana and Palmdale, in different and similar ways, characterize the empirical
basis for such an approach. This thesis does not argue that the stories of Palmdale and
Fontana suggest the “postmodern” framework is the only way to understand the city.
However, the L.A. School’s framework and Davis’ Marxist approach help to illuminate
the various implications of the booster led economic transformation of regional Los
Angeles.

Rabid World War II production brought the onset of corporate industry and
government contracts. However, World War II, alone, did not establish these industrial
trends in Los Angeles. While Fontana’s steel mill was built in the climate of wartime

12

The school is not strictly “postmodern,” but it uses the word to signify a break from the traditional
“modern” city. Scholars us Post-fordist, as well as postmodern, to differentiate from past cities centered
around a manufacturing core and the current trend in cities that emphasis both peripheral industry or the
lack of a local manufacturing base with only a service economy present in its absence. Michael Dear’s
“Urban Politics and the Los Angeles School of Urbanism” lays out the schools theoretical approach and
arguments. Michael Dear, “Urban Politics and the Los Angeles School of Urbanism,” Urban Affairs
Review, November 2008, vol. 44 no. 2.
13
Edward W. Soja, Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions (Wilsey-Blackwell, 2000), 77.
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demand, California, for thirty years, “had been trying to get a steel industry.”14 As the
war came to a close, the city’s politicians and businessmen, products of the tradition of
boosterism and very aware that all could come screeching to a halt without conflict,
prepared to develop an urban landscape where their growth could continue.
Kaiser’s factory, Edwards Air Force Base, and Palmdale’s aviation park signaled
a culmination, but it also laid a new foundation. Decades of industrialization within Los
Angeles, stretching back to the 1920s, existed, but it was only with World War II that
these dreams were realized into a regional powerhouse. The steel mill, along Fontana’s
Cherry Street, represented the dynamic shift the Los Angeles economy was about to
undergo, a transformation that established a regional, urban, industrial economy.
While present long before the 1920s, boosters working during that period amidst a
frenzy of economic and population growth. They were determined to decentralize
fragment, and disperse the growth.15 As the city grew, its population and borders pushed
outward. The Southern California boosters refused to have their constituents live in a
crowded urban environment like that of Chicago or New York. Fontana and Palmdale,
while far away from any sort of traditional downtown, were, and still are in Palmdale’s
case, inherently a part of Los Angeles because of this idea of decentralization. As the
metropolis grew during World War II new arguments for industrial decentralization were
made on top of those first construct during the 1920s. Palmdale and Fontana picked up
the torch; both were simultaneously the next great step for Los Angeles urbanization and
the physical iteration of an “ecology of evil.”16 Los Angeles’ “ecology of evil” defines

14

McWilliams, California: The Great Exception, 240.
Robert Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles from 1850-1930 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992).
16
Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (Ann Arbor: Vintage Books, 1992), 4.
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the great city as a sprawling capitalist urban form swallowing up the landscape. This
ecology is dependent on unsustainable militarized industry embattled by the end of the
Cold War and the decline of an American industrial economy.17
In Antelope Valley, the desert people of Palmdale and Muroc, became part of the
metropolis not through the redrawing of borders, an anachronism in Los Angeles, but by
the industrial development of Air Force Plant 42, the Palmdale Airport, and Edwards Air
Force base – all cutting edge components of the region’s military economy. Combined
with Fontana, the continuing trend of dispersion, and the marriages of arms and
economics like Cal Tech’s rise to prominence, these places contain stories that
characterize the nation’s preeminent regional metropolitan economy and construct a
narrative to underwrite the implications facing the metropolis today. Los Angeles is far
more than the urban embodiment of a military industrial complex. Los Angeles is a
unique representation of the economic and industrial experiences America underwent
during the post-war years. Civic leaders in Fontana, Palmdale, and Los Angeles, unable
to predict the future, established their communities in a context of decentralization and
economic prosperity dependent on defense spending. When American capitalism
evolved, the transformation forced Fontana and Palmdale to re-adapt. Their current
leaders and boosters continue to search for progress and prosperity, but they can now do
so with the knowledge of the system’s paradoxes and nuances and the mistakes of the
preceding generations of boosters.
Deleted Image

17

Mike Davis, City of Quartz, (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 4.
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From Tom Zimmerman, Paradise Promoted: The Booster Campaign that Created Los
Angeles, (Santa Monica: Angel City Press, 2008).

Chapter 1
Metropolitan Marriages: Boosterism, Urban Decentralization, and the Roots of the
Military Industrial Complex
“With cities, it is as with dreams: everything imaginable can be dreamed, but
even the most unexpected dream is a rebus that conceals a desire or, its reverse, a
fear. Cities, like dreams, are made of desires and fears, even if the thread of their
discourse is secret, their rules are absurd, their perspectives deceitful, and
everything conceals something else.”
- Italo Calvino18
From a narrow viewpoint, federal demand for raw resources and future defense
contracts industrialized and directed Fontana and Palmdale down their respective paths as
peripheral hubs of the Los Angeles area. However, the forces that drove the politics and
business activity behind developing these two places during and after the war were not
creations of the wartime economy. To the contrary, they embody traditional continuities
established long ago in Los Angeles. Los Angeles, “the great laboratory of
experimentation,” developed, as a modern city, at the hands of deliberate and active
boosterism. Los Angeles, with its boosters acting as both urban planners and capitalists,
did not abandon this tradition. Instead, the idea of continued growth in not just size but
also modern industry became an underlying factor in the way the city settled out across
the plain, and then into the deserts and valley. Long before World War II, boosters
planted the urban tensions present in Palmdale and Fontana today, as desire for growth
clashed with such a desires real demerits and ironies.
During the 1920s, boosters developed a unique approach to handling their city’s
growth. Fearing the calamities of East Coast cities – congestion and centralization – the
18

Italo Calvino, translated by Harcourt, Inc. Invisible Cities, (United States, 1974), 44.
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boosters installed a tradition of urban and industrial dispersion and decentralization.
These forces became fundamental to the city’s, and then region’s growth. Fontana and
Palmdale, both far removed from the concerns of 1920s boosters, are still representative
of their ideas. They represent the real implications of not just the urban and industrial
decentralization developed during the 1920s, but also the way in which it became
entangled with defense based industries and federal spending.
World War II represented yet another opportunity, a colossal one, for extending
the tradition of growth further through time and adding more elements of industry and
modernity to the regional metropolis. Robert Lotchin established this thesis about the
city, writing:
In California, where war and urban society are both hyper extended, the
connection between these two entities did not originate through World War II or
Cald War actions of bureaucrats of the modern nation-state or through defense
giants such as Boeing…Lockheed…It grew out of the efforts of World War I and
interwar city builders to find an economic nice for their rapidly growing and
dynamic but unstable cities and military men hoping to arrest the decline of their
services.19
Twenty years before Pearl Harbor, local boosterism attached itself to ideas and themes of
development that defined not just the rampant metropolitan growth of the 1920s but the
peripheral urbanization represented by Fontana and Palmdale during the war and postwar
periods.
Morris Markey, a British tourist visiting Los Angeles in 1932, asked, “Why did a
town spring up here and why has it grown so big?”20 The answer was not wartime
demand, still ten years away. Nor was it inherent in the land – unfertile before irrigated

19

Roger W. Lotchin, introduction, Fortress California 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), xv.
20
Robert Fishman, foreword to The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles from 1850-1930 by Robert
Fogelson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
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by men, without an ideal natural port like the Bay Area cities, and without immediately
apparent natural resources. As historian Robert Fogelson explained, “the Los Angeles
elite very early realized that their real business was growth itself.”21 A city without the
locational advantages of a New York or Chicago, L.A. emerged, or rather synthesized, in
a different form. Los Angeles depended on leaders that realized these deficiencies and
manifested the city’s growth themselves.
Boosterism, the practice of local officials, businessmen, and politicians actively
preaching a gospel of development and growth to further their city, was a driving force
behind Los Angeles’ legacy. While not always a self-identifying group, Henry Chandler,
publisher of the Times, Carey McWilliams, historian and labor activist, Henry Arnold,
Air Force general, Howard Hughes, aviation industrialists, A.W. Ross, real estate mogul,
William Mulholland, water and transit developer, Fletcher Bowron, mayor from 19381953, and Henry Kaiser, national business mogul, can all be considered Angeleno
“boosters.”
In addition to notions of dispersion, boosters also institutionalized the emphasis of
military industry – the second theme prevalent in Fontana and Palmdales’ stories.
California, especially Los Angeles, matched its tradition of boosterism to the relationship
between war and urbanization.22 In California, argues Robert Lotchin in Fortress
California, the relationship between war and urban society sprouted from “the efforts of

21

Robert Fishman, foreword to The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles from 1850-1930 by Robert
Fogelson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
22
Roger W. Lotchin, preface to Fortress California 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
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World War I and interwar city-builders to find an economic niche for their rapidly
growing but unstable cities.”23
While various industries flourished during the 1920s, several aviation companies
made permanent homes in Los Angeles during the decade, long before their bombers and
fighters were key to military strategy in World War II. In 1941, Harpers called the city
“the cradle of American air power, the Pittsburgh of the U.S. aircraft industry.”24 The
war did not bring aviation industry into Los Angeles. In 1946, Los Angeles averaged
about 4,400 people per square mile. New York had a density six times as much, Chicago
four.25

Instead, it played on an existing presence, evolving an already beginning process

that eventually married aerospace industry to national defense spending.
Fear of urban centralization and congestion urged boosters and businesses to
incorporate the space around them in defining the city on their terms. Together, this
partnership, in most part through the Chamber of Commerce, segmented and fragmented
population, transportation, and industry to build a new urban environment. In 1924, the
entire Los Angeles basin had been subdivided not by organic communities but along
legal lines; much of the segments were still unpopulated and entirely vacant.26
Robert Fogelson, in his biography of the city’s beginnings, uses “fragmentation”
to identify the themes prevalent during the period. The city would split into political,
social, cultural, but most importantly industrial and spatial segments. Devout Angelenos
that, in the Western metropolis, transliterated manifest destiny from a geographical creed

23

Lotchin, intro to Fortress California, xv.
“City of the Angels,” Fortune, March, 1941, pg. 90-95.
25
Mel Scott, Metropolitan Los Angeles: One Community (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation, 1949) 50.
26
Roth, “Mulholland Highway and the Engineering Culture of Los Angeles in the 1920s,” ” ed. By Tom
Sitton and William Deverell for Metropolis in the Making (Los Angeles, Berkely, and London: University
of California Press, 1999), 54.
24
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to urban economic growth welcomed population and industrial expansion. Upon its
arrival, these boosters worked to establish what they believed to be the ideal built
environment and market to best capitalize on consumer and government demand. The
stories of Los Angeles’s embattled military industrial complex, twisted suburban and
urban identities, and distressed housing markets all trace back to the implications of an
entrenched and deified essence of the civic booster.

“Every city has a direct economic ancestry, a literal economic parentage, in a still
older city or cities. New cities do not arise by spontaneous generation. The spark of
city economic life is passed on from older cities to the younger.”
-Jane Jacobs27
During the 1920’s, industry in L.A. was growing faster than it was in any other
place in the country. Population doubled to more than 1.2 million in 1930 from 570,000
in 1920. The County of Los Angeles would grow from 1,238,000 to 2,200,000 in that
same period.28 Los Angeles Harbor beckoned 2,886 ships to dock behind its sea wall in
the fiscal year 1920. During fiscal year 1930, 8,633 boats made their way into Los
Angeles Harbor.29 Total land area of the city grew by about eighty square miles through
means of forty-five separate property annexations throughout the decade.30 Los Angeles
took on significant characteristics of its modern form during the 1920s as more than
population changed – especially the presence of the car circulating amidst the urban
sprawl.31 Downtown traffic created significant transit congestion.

27

Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (London: Vintage, 1970), 176.
Martin Wachs, “Autos, Transit and the Sprawl of Los Angeles: The 1920s,” Institute of Transportation
Studies University of California, Irvine. 8.
29
Wachs, “Autos, Transit and the Sprawl of Los Angeles: The 1920s,” 10.
30
Greg Hise, “Industry and Imaginative Geographies” ed. By Tom Sitton and William Deverell for
Metropolis in the Making (Los Angeles, Berkely, and London: University of California Press, 1999) 18.
31
Jules Tygiel, “Metropolis in the Making” ed. by Tom Sitton and William Deverell for Metropolis in the
Making (Los Angeles, Berkely, and London: University of California Press, 1999), 2.
28
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Industrial boom was prominent in most industries, from Hollywood to oil and
rubber.32 Impossible to separate from the population growth and physical expansion of
the city, this economic growth prodded businessmen and boosters to concern themselves
with the city’s planning. “Miracles occurred on both supply and demand sides of the
industrial equation,” writes Mike Davis.33 In a move to confront this confluence of
growth in Los Angeles, planned development would be heralded as the cure, cementing
the urban landscape and themes of Los Angeles.
The Los Angeles elite, even before the arrival of widespread national economic
expansion, began to desire economic boom and planned accordingly. Fogelson writes,
that as early as 1915:
The leaders of the Chamber [of Commerce] wooed industrialists with as much
Map showing population growth throughout the Los Angeles Basin, orange is 1920-1928. From page 9 of
Frank L. Meline Corporation’s Los Angeles: Metropolis of the West.

fervor as they had once coaxed immigrants. They described expanding markets,
available resources, and cheaper transportation with as much enthusiasm as they
had once depicted an easier life, softer climate, and more picturesque landscape.34
The 1920s, and the lead up into them, coincided with a revising of financial goals for the
city. City boosters moved the emphasis from agriculture to industry with urgency as
they became aware of the exploding growth.35 A Los Angeles Times article, entitled
“Balanced Progress,” from 1923, was fully aware of the remarkable goings on in the city.
32

Jules Tygiel, “Metropolis in the Making” 3. Population growth did not come to a complete slow down
after the 1920s and picked up dramatically again in the 1940s. Population grew by 590,000 in the 1930s
and 12. Million in the 1940s. “Motor-borne Los Angeles Gives Industry that Open-Air Touch,”
Businessweek, May, 1957, 174.
33
Mike Davis, “Sunshine and the Open Shop” ed. by Tom Siton and William Deverell for Metropolis in the
Making, (Los Angeles, Berkely and London: University of California Press, 1999), 96.
34
Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis, 127.
35
Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis, 120-130.
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It started, “Los Angeles stands at the dawn of a golden tomorrow.”36 The article, while
optimistic, urges the Angelenos to recognize the problems associated with the gift of
growth – recommending expansion in both maritime industry, water supply, and the
“white coal” industry.37 This angelic phrase, possibly playing off racial themes,
referenced electricity and other methods of power, as the editorial recognizes that coal
could not sustain Los Angeles alone as it sprawls out over the basin.
Los Angeles was the cutting edge of such urban revolutions, involving “not so
much an increase in the size of cities as an expansive recomposition of the urban
population.”38 L.A. was an ideal stage for this recomposition – a luxury that New York,
Chicago, and London never had. There was not just a need, now in the modern era, for
reorganizing people but also infrastructure and industry.39
Boosters, for years, had advertised Los Angeles across the country – ongoing
migrations existed long before the 1920s. Once again, during a decade of unprecedented
economic growth, the boosters once again prodded Americans and Anglo immigrants to
migrate to their new American city that, while not a city on a hill, had even loftier
ambitions. They did as much as possible with their influence to plan and sell the boom
to all those who were interested. Akin to the transportation development, officials
crafted plans to decentralize and fragment the offspring of the economic growth, the
Chamber of Commerce made plans for economic growth before it came. This growth
came in a certain way, with emphasis on the booming industrial sector of the city. In
1930, Los Angeles had 724,000 employees in the industrial sector; this was almost an

36

“Balanced Progress,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 1923, II4. http://www.proquest.com/
“Balanced Progress,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 1923, II4. http://www.proquest.com/
38
Edward W. Soja, Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions (Wilsey-Blackwell, 2000), 77.
39
Soja, Postmetropolis, 77.
37
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increase of three times from the number of industrial employees in 1920.40
With what was perceived as near unlimited space for growth, urban
decentralization by means of transit, industrial, and residential policy became creed.
Disperse, rather than gather. Motion over stasis. This maxim was the code of
development in the 1920’s as the city moved away from its Spanish Mexican past.
Economic boom in the 1920’s spurred the shaping of a metropolis that was dynamic and
forward thinking – anything that could be, would be planned and developed. Boulevards
were methodically extended in order to alleviate traffic. Whereas Boston evolved from
cattle paths perpetually going in some unknown direction, Los Angeles was a different
case, one that was intimately entwined with the roots of dynamism in America.
The 1920s witnessed the establishment of the City Planning Commission in 1920
and the Regional Planning Commission in 1923, heralded by city planners and
consultants like the Frank Meline Company, as the first of its kind.41 In 1924, the
commission finished the Major Street Traffic Plan, to be approved by voters a season
later.42 This established a concrete plan and goal of boulevarding the city, providing
arteries and veins for Angelenos so circulate among their city's segments. More
importantly, though, was the city planner’s concerns with zoning, a practice that
occupied 85% of the Regional Planning Commission’s time – a testament to the
underlying desires to segment, rather than construct.43
In the days leading up to the vote on the Major Street Traffic Plan’s bond
40
41

Scott, Metropolitan Los Angeles, 54.
Frank Meline Inc., Los Angeles: The Metropolis of the West (Los Angeles: Frank L. Meline, Inc., 1929),

4.
42

Matthew W. Roth, “Mulholland Highway and the Engineering Culture of Los Angeles in the 1920s” ed.
By Tom Sitton and William Deverell for Metropolis in the Making (Los Angeles, Berkely, and London:
University of California Press, 1999), 51.
43
Lotchin, Fortress California, 184.
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initiative, Henry Chandler’s, who sat on a private commission that advised the City’s
board, Los Angeles Times paper published a flurry of pieces campaigning for the plan.44
In October 1924, less than a month before the vote, the Times wrote, “There is neither
speed, comfort, nor safety in the congestion that prevails at present and many motorists
are unable to use their cars to advantage.”45 Later in October, the paper argued that the
plan “corrects evils” and orchestrates future development of all the city’s streets.46
In addition, and while not quite the on the tangible scale that projects the Major
Street Traffic Plan, the city and its capitalists also organized various public works
projects that now serve as metaphors of Los Angeles’ narrative.47 Mullholland Highway,
cascading from Hollywood to the Pacific Ocean, was a project that had less to do with
real dispersion of population and industry. However the Highway, a “massive reordering
of the natural environment,” was a more romantic result of 1920s growth and
planning.48 The Highway showed the influence of real estate and the boosters’ desire to
mold a concept of motion through an environment into the city’s lore.
Reyner Banham, an architectural critic that argued there was an explicit
connection between the built environment, the architecture of Los Angeles and the
automobiles, treated Mulholland as a civic accomplishment indicative of Los Angeles’
shared conscience - a public space and attraction that was unlike any other found in
America cities. The Highway was landmark of motion, even if it was to nowhere but a
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cliff overlooking the final boundaries of Manifest Destiny. 49 Urban decentralization and
industrialization, for Los Angeles, was as much about dispersion as it was about the
city’s ability to command and torque its surrounding environment. Mel Scott wrote, in
his late 1940’s survey of development in his city, “If the Los Angeles area represents
anything, it represents intensive application of science and engineering to the creation of
an environment in which man can enjoy living.”50

Often, historians and thinkers attribute Los Angeles’ distinct culture and
decentralization to the influence of the automobile. Reyner Banham wrote, “So, like the
earlier generations of English intellectuals who taught themselves Italian in order to read
Dante in the original, I learned to drive in order to read Los Angeles in the original.”51
Banham, in practice, is correct. He could walk Los Angeles to study it. Certainly, other
than Detroit, no other city has such a legacy of the automobile. However, the highways
are not the language of Los Angeles, rather they are symbols and expressions of deeply
rooted desires of industrial growth and insecurities that Los Angeles would go on to
mirror the static shortcomings of other American cities.
Fogelson, in his account of the period, certainly places great emphasis on the
automobile and the failure of electric railways as “elite and general population had
Map of Los Angeles Basin showing the well established transit network of the region in 1929, echoing the
cries for decentralization and dispersion that led to L.A.’s embrace of the automobile. from Frank L.
Meline’s 1929 report on the city entitled Los Angeles: Metropolis of the West.
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switched their allegiance from mass transit to the automobile.”52 This shift, in turn,
signaled the decline of a downtown. However, it was not the automobile that drove Los
Angeles to a metropolis of peripheral hubs within a regional economy. Rather, the
automobiles served as both a catalyst and symptom for and of the fanatic dispersion of
growth. This solution also resulted in Los Angeles’ distinct breed of progressivism that
was not necessarily tied to partisanship, although the city certainly had its social
progressives and vehemently conservative blocs. The city planning committee created
during this period helps to identify the sort non-partisan progressivism prevalent in much
of the city’s inner circles. Writing in its 1920 report, the commission explained, “Right
from the start, we must understand that we are not the conservative branch of the City
Government…We are the ones who should ‘Dream dreams and see visions’ – visions of
the better city to be.”53 Twenty years down the road, this progressive boosterism was
matched with New Deal liberalism and wartime demand – implementing a new, but
derived, basis of L.A. growth.
Paradoxically, the importance of this progressivism is at odds with the city’s
fundamental private free market values that historians have argued are the twentieth
century evolution, or devolution, of America’s foundational principles of the individual
and progress. However, Fogelson and Sitton both argue that the city planners were
symptomatic of a larger tradition for the city that was driven by adamant private
development that understood the need to work within a framework of urban planning if
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their desires were to be achieved.54 Choice, not equity, served as the main factor of Los
Angeles’ urban form. However, in the 1920s at least, all, in a democratic sense, shared
the freedom for market choice in development was. Fogelson writes, “In all essentials,
the planners shared the populace’s suburban ideals, and the populace agreed with the
metropolitan aspirations.”55
Reyner Banham proclaimed origin of L.A.’s “instant architecture in an instant
townscape” began to come to their anxious climax during the 1920s.56 Unlike cities
across the world, that amassed millions of people over centuries and had roads built over
previous pathways, Los Angeles saw its population brought in within two decades as
structures and roads became the first things to be constructed on their plot.57 Upstart
growth was a backhanded experience for the boosters; it played on their anxieties and
fears of a crowded and polluted city. In 1919, Dana Bartlett, a progressive clergyman
and public figure, wrote of his own fear that Los Angeles could develop into one of
America's eastern cities. He wrote, “As factories increase in size and number, aliens will
be attracted, tenements and house courts will become congested, casing an increase in
sickness and crime.”58 Los Angeles businessmen and politicians loathed the same
possibility for their city and more than overlapped in an implicit coalition with more
leftist progressives like Bartlett and Carey McWilliams.59
Before the opening acts of the Great Depression, Los Angeles had established
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itself as a metropolis firmly developed within the modern age. Los Angeles was a city
founded well past the enlightenment and industrial revolution, able to internalize
rationality, capitalism, and industry from a unique perspective not available to most other
American metropolises. Implicitly aware of this fact, the Times wrote:
The people of Los Angeles have reached the point where they realize that the
future growth of Los Angeles must be systematic, scientific, modern…They
showed it when they approved the Major Street Traffic Plan. They have shown it
when they have given, constantly, their un-official but whole-hearted approval to
the zoning and set-back regulations. The days of helter-skelter growth are gone.
The time has come for an orderly upbuilding [sic] of Los Angeles.60
Los Angeles boosters, during the 1920s, combined the essence of unfettered capitalism
with rational conceptions of how the city should be planned. These two themes may
seem at odds, but they both echoed two separate local desires for Angelenos. A booming
metropolis independent of the rust belt or east coast industry unlike any other city, void
of the squalor and shortcomings overcrowding and irrational, haphazardly organic
growth creates. Greg Hise, a historian of the city, explaining in his article Imagined
Georaphies, “The 1920s was a generative period when civic elites, entrepreneurs, and
workers fixed the coordinates for an industrial Los Angeles that has structured the
pattern of city building and urban life from that time forward.”61
During the depression, as populations increase subsided and businesses
contracted, the need, and the financial base, for planned growth and dispersal or
segmentation slowed. Importantly, the depression did not unwind the progress and
growth Los Angeles had made during the 1920s, it also retained the unique character built
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over the past half century.62 With the final unraveling of the electric railway during the
mid 1930s, the automobile became the primary mode of transportation. Again, the car
was not a driving force behind L.A.’s demeanor but rather went hand in hand with the
metropolises character. However, with the end deterioration of the light rail in the 1930s,
the potential for peripheral hubs was no longer contingent on railroad tracks, but rather
other fears of growth – congestion, environment, and industry.63
“Thus, civilization, pressing ever westward, has passed and narrowed the desert and
reached the sea. Here at the end of the Western Trail is being developed a
manufacturing and marketing center that is destined to become the mistress of the
Western Sea.”64
-Frank L. Meline Company
The 1920s comprised of not only the manifestation of a cultural and urban
tradition of boosterism and rational decentralizing, but also the tangible roots of the
aviation industry already entangling themselves with military demand, federal
government, and local politics. Especially, this meant the development of factories in
Long Beach, Santa Monica, and Burbank. However, politicians, advisers, and
businessmen also began to involve public policy with aerospace industry and business –
from airports to corporations.
The Los Angeles Regional Planning Commission, while concerned with larger
trends of industrial decentralization and municipal policy, exhibited intimate involvment
and analysis of an aerospace presence in the city, its importance, and eventually, its
necessity. In 1928 and 1929 the committee published reports on future airport sites, a
nod to both the desire to disperse population, and the airports used by people, around the
county and the inherent presence airplanes had come to have for the western metropolis.
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Colonel William J. Fox, later a general vital during the post-war years at Palmdale,
represented the commission and presented forty-five potential sites for military or
civilian airfield in 1928. A year later, he listed forty-nine fields.65

Los Angeles, during the 1920s, looked to surge ahead as an aviation center, and
succeeded “through actions taken by key local figures at critical historical junctures.”66
Civic leaders tempted aviation corporations to relocate or develop a presence in Los
Angeles, merging industry with the military presence and scientific research during the
late 1920s and 1930s; this provided for a definitive foundation that reached critical mass
with the mass manufacturing and demand of World War II and would not subside for
decade. Los Angeles, fifteen years later, became the prototypical Fordist and Keynesian
city because of the urban institutions established during the 1920s.67 Mass consumption
and production flourished in the city where the New Deal order settled in its own breed
of partnership between government spending and big business.
Each city looking to become an aviation hub had its own boosters, from Dayton to
1929 Chamber of Commerce advertisement from From Tom Zimmerman, Paradise Promoted: The
Booster Campaign that Created Los Angeles, (Santa Monica: Angel City Press, 2008).

Detroit or San Francisco. In Los Angeles, there exists a cultural legacy; it was the first
city to hose a major American air show, in 1910.68 Los Angeles defies the intuitive
notion that established industrial regions are more welcoming to new industries because
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of prominent capital, labor, and research resources – as was the case with original
Midwestern aerospace hubs in the steel belt. However, traditional industries can become
static, deferring innovation to seek out other locations based on other metrics, like
climate, space, and potential growth.69 Aviation presence in L.A. was simultaneously
both a synthetic and organic process. Boosters, local military men of the large armed
presence, and politicians used visible hands to coerce aerospace industry to congregate,
ironically, in the city that preached dispersion.
The founding fathers of early Aerospace companies, Glenn Martin, Donald
Douglas, the Lockheeds, Jack Northrop, and Howard Hughes, naturally favored L.A.
because it was either their home state, a hotbed for growth, a friendly climate for
airplanes, or of superior economic cost.70 The geographic and climate arguments are not
sufficient, several firms would go on to fail in Los Angeles during the 1920s and San
Diego never grew to hold the same weight as an aviation manufacturing center as Los
Angeles did. Rather, the fears and anxieties of urban potential unmet of L.A. officials
and businessmen that drove them to campaign for immediate industrialization met a
match in the relatively vulnerable aviation business and aviation wing of the military.
Together, the city boosters, businessmen, and military officials used each others
resources in the L.A. area to establish this industrial presence. Lotchin called this an
“extraordinarily air minded urban culture.”71 The air-minded urban culture had profound
effects on shaping the political economy and capitalist system in Los Angeles, but also,
as it spread during World War II, the entire country.
Groups like the All-Year Club, helped with the start of Harry Chandler, or the
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Aviation Department of the Chamber of Commerce publicized Southern California as a
business and residential mecca.72 Chandler was a key aviation booster, a media mogul
that prodded the Chamber of Commerce to further recruit Eastern industry, he helped
finance the Western Air Express company, a founding half of what was to become TWA
in a 1929 via merger.73 The Chamber of Commerce, in the 1920s, began to aggressively
woo industry and business, accepting and promulgating all arguments that concluded
with Los Angeles as the ideal factory site.74 By 1938, on the brink of war, about two
thirds of the countries airframe manufacturers were present in the City of Angels.75
Personal relationships, in many ways incubated by the urban culture of the city,
were critical as well. Men throughout the military hierarchies and civilian corporate
bureaucracies understood the Los Angeles economic environment as a unique one.
Promising military men came to Los Angeles to be “cultivated” with the ambitions that
they would grow into officers with significant industrial power. No man exemplifies this
more than Hap Arnold, climbing to head the Air Corps and then the mastermind behind
the structuring of the Air Force.76 Figures like Donald Douglas, Von Karman, and
Robert Millikan all developed personal relationships not just with their work and city,
but also the military figures they worked with to develop defense technologies, factories,
and contracts.77
The California Institute of Technology, critical in producing the aerospace
technology that became intrinsic to national defense during and after World War II, also
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experienced the formative forces of 1920s boosterism. While founded in the 1890s, the
California Institute of Technology began to hit full stride in the 1920s. During this
period, research done at Caltech, in sunny Pasadena, became of paramount interest to
politicians and generals involved with air defense projects.
Daniel Guggenheim, in 1926, wrote the Secretary of Commerce and soon to be
President Herbert Hoover. Guggenheim, a recent convert to the field of aviation
boosterism, announced in the letter a grant of $1.6 million from the Guggenheim Fund
towards serving engineers and scientists involved in aeronautics. By no coincidence,
some of this money Guggenheim earmarked for Caltech – the scientist and school
administrator Robert Millikan used the grant to fund Theodore von Karman’s transfer to
the school. Von Karman, a brilliant physicist and aeronautics researcher, went on to
produce significant work inside and outside the laboratory for Southern California as a
scientist and adviser to Henry Arnold – future father of the Air Force and key figure in
the story of Palmdale.78
The same year that von Karman committed to CIT, the university announced a
permanent building for studying aeronautics. To this day, it is known as the Guggenheim
Laboratory.79 In defending the financial commitment behind such an aspiration, it
mentions the local importance of aviation – choosing to highlight Douglas’ Santa Monica
factory.80 In the building, a small wind tunnel, conceived by von Karma, was designed.
Famous American warplanes key to Allied victory like the P-51 Mustang, B-17 Flying
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Fortress, B-24 Liberator, and P-38 Lightning were all tested in the tunnel. The
university felt the lab was so important to national defense that armed guards were
stationed outside the lab during World War II.81
By the late 1930s, Southern California had an abnormal concentration of both
civilian and military aviation activities that coalesced to develop the city together.
Fortune, in 1941, wrote: “This [early aircraft] industry was sleeping in the same
bedroom, if not in the same bed, with the U.S. Army and Navy.”82 Frighteningly
foresightful, an almost “dynastic alliance later emerged between the to when Henry
Arnold’s son Bruce Arnold married Barbara Douglas.83
Of equally importance was the spatial and geographic framework of the Los
Angeles industrial area. By 1940, essentially all of the City of Los Angeles was built-up
and industrialized – pushing the boundaries of an industrial zone fundamentally
developed on the idea of dispersion. By accommodating postwar growth, Los Angeles
developed what Soja calls “technopoles” – internal and peripheral industrial and urban
hubs of the regional space that represented Los Angeles scaffolding.84
Throughout the same period, as fascist countries turned to Darwinian principles in
international politics to justify expansionary and militarism, the same principles were at
work between California cities. Once competition between L.A., San Diego, and San
Francisco took off, it picked up even more momentum as each city vied more and more
for aviation and military puzzle pieces necessary in industrializing and urbanizing each
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of their cities.85 World War II would bring a slight halt to such cut throat boosterism, but
it represented a period of continuity and change in Los Angeles as the roots for a built
environment in which militarized industry and development were integral were already
laid. The boom in consumer demand and defense spending nurtured these roots and
introduced new notions of decentralization, technology, and capitalism that pushed the
implications and contradictions further to create America’s first post-New Deal industrial
metropolis.
Chapter 2
Los Angeles Boosters and Wartime Catalysts
“Los Angeles is a city looking for a ritual to join its fragments, and The Doors are
looking for such a ritual also. A kind of electric wedding. We hide ourselves in the
music to reveal ourselves.”
-Jim Morrison
In 1943, Milton Silver of the San Francisco Chronicle dubbed the period
California’s “Second Gold Rush.”86 John Anson Ford, a county and municipal official
for decades, stated “1,000 persons per day were settling” in Los Angeles County during
the war.87 The war “worked an economic miracle.”88 However, from another
perspective, Los Angeles, now in the climate of conflict, continued to work its own
economic miracles yet again. With wartime demand for airplanes, steel, and other
defense related products as the focal point of American industry, Los Angeles’ tradition
of aviation boosterism jumped at the bit – further entwining its economy with
decentralized industry dependent on defense contracts.
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Scholars traditionally interpret the effect of World War II on Los Angeles and
California’s political economy in two ways. In one light, World War II carried drastic
importance in solidifying the Keynesian industrial system that has defined American
capitalism. To the contrary, but not mutually exclusive, World War II did not necessarily
create new paradigms, but rather revised continuities and generalizations of Los Angeles
political economy and culture from the pre-war period. Neither explanation trumps the
other and both derived from bigger arguments about World War II’s effects on the
American nation, people, and identity as a whole that struggle with the complexities of
the conflict. In Los Angeles industrial themes continued throughout the war the conlict
influenced shaped post-war planning as it relates to Palmdale, Edwards, and Fontana, in
fundamental ways. World War II did not rewrite the Angeleno economy, but it added
new reagents to produce reactions simultaneously rooted in the city’s earlier history,
particularly the 1920s, but also dependent on the broad strokes of wartime America.
The transitions from wartime to peacetime economy were critical for Los
Angeles, a city that had, for decades, internalized fears of inadequate economic and urban
growth. The city and its proprietors, as was the case with many around the country,
recognized a need to accommodate peacetime contractions. In 1949, amidst post-war
developments in the Antelope Valley, Fortune reflected on the city’s capitalist
environment since the wars ending. A June article noted a remarkable fact about
industrial Los Angeles, dubbed “The Undiscovered City.” The article read, “postwar
expansion of the Los Angeles industrial plant has very nearly equaled the wartime
growth.”89 Industrial Los Angeles, explains Fortune, was undergoing changes in the
postwar year, shipbuilding slowed and aerospace had employed a quarter of its wartime
89
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force in the region, but overall, industry fulfilled its intentions of avoiding any sort of
downsizing.90 This balancing was no accident, and is at the crux of the new type of
growth that Los Angeles would find itself atop in the 1950s. Importantly, the transition
to peacetime influenced the industrialization already beginning on Los Angeles new
capitalist borders in Fontana and would spur new industrial presence in the Antelope
Valley. At the same time, however, these transitions were rooted in continuing trends
from before and during the war – echoing entrenched Angeleno sentiments about
preparing for progress. Just as the metropolis prepared for peace, it also presented rooted
ideas about how to best accommodate and advance the war effort synthesized more by
the city’s tradition of growth than the declaration of war itself.
“The Vision to See, the Faith to Believe, the Courage to Do.”
- A sundial in Union Station
War, for the United States nominally began in 1941, but, in practice, the wartime
mobilization began earlier, in anticipation of conflict. Los Angeles, the dynamic
metropolis, was not far from this effort. Mayor Bowron and advisers had produced and
revised ample plans in anticipation of U.S. entry into the war before. Meeting with city
official in city hall immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bowron put into
operation the contingency plans they had created.91 In May of 1940, the private sector
began to gestate civic defense when Chamber of Commerce organized the Defense
Committee of Southern California. The committee was a collection of two hundred
business leaders tasked with assisting military presence in the area as they organized a
defense effort.92
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The city, as a whole unit and not just the back room politicians, had also
experienced a shift towards war well before the official declaration. From 1940 to 1941,
aircraft production in the county doubled as aircraft and “allied industry” became the
leading employers in the region.93 Arthur G. Coons, a Claremont professor and
consultant of the National Resources Planning Board and California State Planning Board
in only December of 1941 already noticed the implications of defense industry on the
regional economy, playing on the anxieties that many blame for perpetuating a
militarized economy. In an address at the Pacific Southwest Academy, he argued,
“[market domination by aviation defense spending] establishes a significant amount of
dependence upon a single industry and heightens the vulnerability of the economy in the
event of a cessation of aircraft demand.”94 While prescient, there was little way of
avoiding the necessary demands for plans and tanks and little traction for any argument
that could be twisted to suggest growth and patriotism did not go hand in hand.
As it did through the growth of the 1920s, the L.A. Chamber of Commerce played
nominal and real roles for installing frameworks of industrial evolution. In January of
1942, the directors agreed to permanently establish their “war contract plan.” The plan
had begun sixth months prior as a trial run for producing business during the expected
U.S. entry into the war. Meeting in January 1942, both in light of the trial’s success and
the full mobilization of the American country into conflict, the board approved
establishing the expensive plan indefinitely. The plan called for building a war pool of
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contracts and chamber staff members, daily, went through about 250 government contract
proposals and delivered early notification to the L.A. manufacturing firms best set to bid
on the proposals. Business Week reported the chamber cataloged and analyzed the cities
6,000 industrial firms in order to better understand the manufacturing supply the city
could use to meet federal demand for wartime goods.95 World War II presented an
opportunity for the Chamber to aggregate the city into a collective unit bargaining for
military contracts. The wartime agenda continued the Chamber’s drive to further
“produce” business in the area. However, progress was made within the context of
unprecedented worldwide conflict that drove the U.S. government to previously unseen
heights of federal spending – during the wartime period, the federal government spent
more than it had in its previous entirety from the founding.96
The county Chamber put forth an industrial development plan early in the war
that placed economic growth strictly within the confines of the war effort, diplomatically
deflating their own opportunism in light of the conflict. However, it reiterated the
challenge Los Angeles boosters self-imposed, “The issue is squarely before business men
of Los Angeles County,” the plan declared, “as to whether we shall come forward now
with a well conceived program of industrial development.”97
While carrying two thirds of the $1.5 billion dollar backlog for Pacific aviation
factories, Los Angeles’ factories did “not dominate the landscape,” wrote Fortune. Only
one factory lay within city limits, the zoning policy and a decentralization culture spaced
the rest around the county. Fortune noted, in 1941, that only two factories caused
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significant traffic due to their close proximity.98 The fears of decentralization that drove
industrial development during the 1920s pervaded throughout war years, foreshadowing
the rise of arguments about pushing defense industry into the periphery.
Over the course of the war, beginning in 1939, Los Angeles moved from the
seventh ranked industrial area, based on value of industrial product, in the United States
to the second. Only Detroit was ahead of Los Angeles, an area that ranked ninth in the
country as late as 1929.99 Boosters had long planned for Los Angeles to grow into the
next great American industrial city, but it was not until they capitalized on aviation and
other wartime dividends that this became a reality.
As federal demand for war materials drove never before seen levels of deficit
spending, the national economy finally emerged out of depression. Unemployment,
nationally, dropped to 1% national during war years.100 Los Angeles, while perhaps more
ably equipped to haul in federal contracts with its legacy of civilian and military aviation,
was not the only city that matured into an industrial giant. Buffalo, Norfolk, San Diego,
Portland, and Las Vegas were all American cities that capitalized in the short run on the
wartime economy.101
Even as the backlog approached two billion in 1942, double the previous year,
contracts did not come fast enough to satiate the city’s desire for growth.102 Los Angeles,
was unable to secure federal funds for improving its airports, unlike San Diego and San
Francisco. The mayor and politicians, unable to pump as much visible municipal money
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to drive a military presence towards the city before the war, did not secure a “sufficiently
high priority rating” from the Civil Aeronautics Administration.103 Mayor Bowron was
aware that if he could expand Mines Field the Navy and Army might be persuaded to
increase operations in the Southland. He accused the government and military of
favoring other areas over Los Angeles.104 Tomm Sitton, a historian and biographer,
argues that Bowron’s administration became increasingly dependent on federal
assistance, and thereby exacerbating the competition for federal contracts.105
While Los Angeles felt alienated from other Californian cities receiving federal
wartime money, its officials simultaneously argued the west, as a region, was
antagonized by the Eastern cities. National, or at least non-Angeleno, calls for industrial
decentralization or dispersal became a grave fear to Los Angeles politicians like Bowron.
The city that heralded urban decentralization now feared its next evolution – industrial
decentralization on a national scale for reasons of economic and military necessity. The
Chamber of Commerce came to calling decentralization “industrial evacuation” and
Mayor Bowron frequently used rhetoric that suggested the federal government often
overlooked Los Angeles or that interior cities were in league against the City of
Angels.106 In a letter to Life in 1942, he wrote, “We do feel…the many serious problems
in connection with the war industrial development in and around Los Angeles are not
fully understood and appreciated to the extent that they are given adequate consideration
at Washington.”107
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This paranoia was both a product of internal urban anxieties but also based on real
external skepticism of Los Angeles development as the cradle of American aviation – the
industry most necessary to Allied success. Los Angeles officials, happily ingesting
promises of future growth in the airplane business, had focused on the need to develop
airports and aviation companies before the war started. The war, though, “taught [the
city] that the airplane would be equal to even the hyperbole of the boosters.”108 World
War II was fought and won in the skies by bombers, fighters, and transports. General
Henry Arnold and Cal Tech scientist Theodor von Karman were more aware of this than
city officials – eager to use it as a stepping-stone for a permanent Air Force presence in
Los Angeles and increased federal funding of aeronautical research in Cal Tech.109
In the summer of 1944, at La Guardia Airport in New York, Arnold approached
von Karman on the tarmac. Arnold explained to von Karman, before asking him to
organize the Scientific Advisory Group to the Air Force, “The next Air Force is going to
be built around scientists – around mechanically minded fellows.” When the SAG was
established, later the Scientific Advisroy Board, von Karman worked with four other men
to mold the institution, including Cal Tech colleagues – H.S. Tsien and Frank
Wattendorf. On a five-man commission that developed the literal blueprint for the Air
Force and an implicit blueprint for how the military industrial complex would interact
amongst its subsidiaries, Los Angeles natives held three seats. In compiling a report on
the war effort and material the board researched on a visit to German aeronautical
institutions, the board argued to the military and government, “that air power had been
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the decisive factor in the Allied victory.”110 It was more than a convenient coincidence of
capitalism that Arnold placed von Karman at the head of SAG and he, in turn, helped to
produce the study that emphasized the importance of air power during World War II.
Generals and FDR, in the opening days of the war, had of course realized this fact, but it
was now institutionalized as the founding tenet of the military’s scientific advisory board
– the report became the guiding plans for establishing the new Air Force.111 Los Angeles
and the surrounding desert became central to this expansion.
A Fortune article, preceding Pearl Harbor, commented both on L.A.’s newfound
role as American aviation center and the worries surrounding air power’s new
“cradle.”112 The article called Angeleno air power an incongruity, but just another in a
long line of “eternal incongruities” for the city. Thousands of miles away from the
metals present in the Midwest and necessary for industry, but thousands of miles closer to
potential air attack, the eastern biased Fortune was critical of Angeleno aviation but still
celebrated the “Arsenal of the U.S. Bomber,” writing, of the cherry attitude around
aviations local success, “they are making dive bombers in the land of Oz.” The article
quoted aviation local Donald Douglas, also clearly aware of the industrial paradox. “It’s
all sort of a mad dream,” he said.113
Los Angeles, unlike any other California martial metropolis, developed anxieties
about industrial decentralization – seeing any drive to move industry out as a direct
inhibitor to the “boomtown,” an attempt at urban character assassination. The Chamber
of Commerce took up the banner once again, defending L.A.’s right to the aviation
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industry. A laundry list of arguments was made: the city was far enough from Tokyo,
German air power was not significant in destroying British industrial strength and thus
the Japanese would not be able to destroy Los Angeles’ forges, other cities were
constructing arguments for industrial evacuation not from reason, but personal desires for
their own growth.114
“Every city has had its boom, but the history of Los Angeles is the history of booms.
Actually, the growth of Southern California since 1870 should be regarded as one
continuous boom punctuated at intervals with major explosions.”
-Carey McWilliams115
Cities across America built up urban and economic assets from the war, just as the
country itself built a portfolio that would soon catapult it to top as one of two
superpowers. However, Los Angeles’ officials differentiated their city, falling in line
with their tradition of progress, by not only increasing their pre war assets, but further
connecting them with the military and related arguments about urban decentralization.
Mayor Bowron, who publicly defended local industry and defense contracts often,
was less subtle in a letter to a Navy official about his intentions to develop a big defense
establishment. He wrote, in 1945, of plans to establish a permanent peacetime supply
depot in the area, “You may be assured that the City will be reasonable in the matter of
acquirement by the Navy of the additional land required, now owned by and under the
control of the City’s Harbor Department.”116
In the industrial age, the spoils of war are not reparations or natural resources.
Rather, they are several degrees removed from conflict. The modern spoils of war are the
114
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tanks, planes, and weapons produced by domestic factories working at full capacity,
stimulated by a federal demand that can drive the national economy to new prosperity.
Los Angeles, explained Leroy Edwards, president of the Chamber of Commerce, needed
to “ fight to maintain the hard won [industrial] supremacy we have achieved during the
war.”117 Palmdale, in particular, was an extension of this fanaticism. Fontana, while
more a product of the war, was also a key facet of this capitalist struggle of the
metropolis – the Southland should not just retain steel industry, but grow Kaiser’s plant
into the dominant furnace on the West coast, leaving Provo, Utah’s plant in the dust of
the Mojave desert.
In June of 1949, Fortune noted, “postwar expansion of the Los Angeles industrial
plant has very nearly equaled the wartime growth.”118 Shipbuilding was waning and
aerospace only employed 25% of what it had during the war, but collective urban growth
had not dissipated.119 Deliberate and directed policy was a the crux of transitions to
peacetime that prevented contraction just as focused and visible policy was behind the
growth of the 1920s, the emphasis of aviation, and the courting of Cal Tech and the
military.
The state Chamber of Commerce echoed Fortune’s conclusions in their postwar
economic review albeit with less optimism. The report warned that postwar growth
created challenges, in addition to benefits, for business and government in not only Los
Angeles but also the state.120 A complete disarmament, the report’s authors felt, would
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have had significant effect on the nation’s economy, but in particular, California’s.121
Los Angeles’ bureaucrats, well before this report was published, were determined to not
sit and wait for such disarmament. Adaption, before the war was even over, was key.
Once again, conservative officials skepticism of planning overcame their fears with
pragmatic desires for increased municipal wealth – government’s role could include the
measures designed to procure further growth and local enterprise.
Even with incredible wartime growth, Los Angeles maintained a real ability to not
allow its urban corridors and industrial segments to become congested. In 1946, Los
Angeles averaged about 4,400 people per square mile. New York had a density six times
as much, Chicago four.122 Los Angeles during the war years and immediately afterward,
grew “horizontally rather than vertically.”123 As the city transitioned to peacetime,
arguments for maintaining this decentralization emphasized the importance of peripheral
industry like Fontana and Palmdale – naturally incorporating the two, far away from
downtown, as a new sort of crux for the regional economy.
Lotchin succinctly explains the snowballing effect of the decentralization and
dispersal arguments:
The city builders had lured the aircraft industries in the first place; these in turn
brought the contract which created congestion; and instead of brining a
decentralization of these defense industries, the congestion provided instead more
leverage for these metropolitans to rationalize the need for still more government
spending in the Southland.124
Decentralization, as an urban and industrial idea, was also dynamic. In the 1920s, it
meant the use of highways and zoning to make sure industry and communities were
121

“Summary of The California Economy 1947-1980” by Stanford Research Institute, published 1961 by
California Chamber of Commerce. USC special collections.
122
Scott, Metropolitan Los Angeles, 50.
123
Carey McWilliams, California: The Great Exception, (Conneticut: Greenwood Press, 1949), 238.
124
Lotchin, Fortress California, 144.

Bargmann 43
spread across the plain. During the war, it was defined more on terms of strategic
necessity to prevent the consolidation of vital industries in one area – creating a target for
Japanese bombers. Los Angeles boosters co-opted both definitions to serve Los Angeles’
continuing growth and sprawl across the area, soon reaching into the agricultural and
desert hinterlands once considered well outside the city’s urban sphere.
Chapter 3
Manifesting Destiny in the Desert: Edwards Air Force Base and the Military’s
Arrival as a Cornerstone of Los Angeles’ Decentralized Economy
“A nearly perfect physical environment, Southern California is a great laboratory of
experimentation. Here, under ideal testing conditions, one can discover what will
work, in houses, clothes, furniture, etc. It is a great tribal burial ground for antique
customs and incongruous styles. The fancy eclectic importations soon cancel each
other out and something new is then substituted.”
-Carey McWilliams125
Ninety-nine miles away from downtown Los Angeles, the Corum family
established a small town far into the desert in 1910. The town was named Muroc, their
name spelled backwards. The Corum brothers, homesteaders, slowly grew their desert
yeoman farmer community.126 In less than 50 years, the desert-farming outpost became
the site of perhaps the Air Force’s most important jet testing center, a key training center,
and a massive bombing range. The base and its development coincides with both the
growing partnership between boosters in the region and the military, as well as the allure
of the desert as the next frontier for Los Angeles developer intent on decentralization. 127
General Henry “Hap” Arnold, the father of the U.S. Air Force and a Pasadena
native, had been trying to develop Muroc as a gunnery and bombing range for years
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during the 1930s. Arnold, in his autobiography, reflected on discovering the site,
“Taking off from this dead lake, thousands of young men were to learn how to send their

bombs down accurately on Berlin.”128 However, it was not until he enlisted the help of
the L.A. Chamber of Commerce in spreading interest among congressmen for the project
did he secure a title. President Roosevelt followed up a year later, in 1940, and supported
the proposal to buy 750,000 acres in the Mojave for use as a firing and training range.129
Proclaimed Southern California’s first major Army field training base, the gunnery range
later grew into the premier testing site for next generation jets, designed and
manufactured within driving distance of the Mojave.130
In the domestic military build up to World War II, bonds formed between
businesses, the military, and politicians. The partnerships would have long-term
consequences on the sprawling desert and the region’s economy. The relationship
between the Chamber and the military, willingly coerced by men like Army Colonel
William J. Fox, key in the ensuing development of Palmdale’s airport and factories ten
miles to the south, simultaneously echoed the already present importance of L.A.’s
boosters and foreshadowed the frantic and devout fishing of government defense
contracts that swept through the area during and after WWII.
“Hap” Arnold was a critical figure – the patron military booster for Edwards.
However, allowing Edwards to claim all of Arnold would neglect his incredible role in
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forming the U.S. Air Force as a five-star general with forty-one years of active service.131
Arnold, an officer at March Field, first proposed the use of Muroc Dry Lake as a
bombing range, establishing the physical foundations of Edwards. During the 1930s,
Arnold also developed his own brain trust at March Field in Riverside, filled with the
names of Spaatz, Eaker, Hunter, McNaarney, and Beebe – men that went on to fill key
roles in the bureaucracy of air power Arnold presided over.132 Arnold, while serving at
Riverside, realized, by no coincidence, both the incredible tactical importance of aircraft
in future conflicts and the variety of opportunities Los Angeles presented to the growth of
an air force.
Muroc’s site sat on the periphery, where the desert geography lent itself to testing
the Bell Aircraft SP-59A, the first American jet, and provided isolation from prying
minds, both foreign and domestic.133 John Ball Jr., in his 1962 summary of the base’s
history, explained the attraction of the hard dry lakebed, an “unprecedented natural
airport” that combined with excellent flying weather.134 While the test center would
grow to have vast importance in the region, during the war years, Muroc, was just one of
many signs of Los Angeles’ militarization and had yet to distinguish itself.135
In a county that fanatically worshipped development, Muroc would transform
overnight. “Here…aviation history is written on a day-to-day basis,” claimed Ball,
writing amidst the bases frantic years.136 This claim was certainly true, beginning on
December 7th, 1941. The same day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the Army Air
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Corp ordered a bomber reconnaissance squadron to Muroc, a small base at this point still
65 miles across the lake from the desert farming community the Corum brothers founded
30 years ago.137 Within a year, though, jet engines would overshadow alfalfa fields. By
the end of a decade, the lake bed was no longer a buffer zone but a landing site for the
nation’s cutting edge military technology manufactured ninety miles south where
aerospace industry was centralized in Long Beach, Glendale, and Orange County.
In 1942, Arnold visited Muroc again, this time with the goal of researching
potential sites for testing the XP 59 jet. Later that year, in October, Colonel Laurence
Cragie flew the first American jet at Muroc Air Force base – whisking through the dry
and sparsely populated desert utilizing the almost organic runway created by the dried
lakebed.138 After the war, Chuck Yeager broke the sound barrier flying out of Muroc,
which became Edwards Air Force Base in 1950 in honor of Captain Glen W. Edwards’
1948 death during a test flight.139 Muroc, a fit for Arnold’s bombing range, was just as
appealing for a test-program. Isolated, yet close enough to the major industrial and
manufacturing area for aviation, his past moves to buy up government property in the
middle of the high desert began to pay out its first dividends for the Air Force.140 Soon,
the base evolved into a huge aerospace complex, touted by manufacturers as the preeminent testing location for their products, created just south as another leg of the
Angeleno economy.
Lancaster, the city of 140,000 now just south of Edwards and north of Palmdale,
was a community contingent on the arrival of the Air Force and manufacturing. In 1951,
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civilian labor was still largely imported to Edwards. The environment, while hospitable
to large jets and experimental aircraft, provided for difficult living conditions in a remote
and underdeveloped area. Title VIII of the Federal Housing Administration, a new
military housing program elongating the New Deal into post-WWII America, revealed
that forces from the top increasingly began to focus on the shortage of labor. The Air
Force officers in Muroc used Title VIII, in one of its initial projects, to develop 724
residences in Muroc. All were air-conditioned and, representing both the consumer
society and Cold War anxieties of 1950s America, insulated and sealed against a poison
gas attack.141
Tom Wolfe’s The Right Stuff, set at Edwards, and later the film of the same name,
synthesized a cultural narrative of the barren communities at the heart of the western
military-industrial complex.142 Twentieth century cowboys, the pilots provided the final
glamour to an assembly line process that involved boosters and bolts. At Edwards, the
20th century cowboys tested the planes and bombs manufactured at either Air Force Plant
42 in Palmdale or in the original aerospace hubs of Los Angeles. A romanticized and
modernized notion of manifest destiny nevertheless, does not adequately explain what
motivated the production of jets among the dunes. The environment and open space
played significant roles in attracting the Air Force, but in the end it was a conglomeration
of arguments made by colonels, businessmen, and politicians that urbanized the
outermost periphery of Los Angeles and revised the region’s political economy.
At Edwards, acceleration was a tautology both during and after the war. From
1945 through the early 1950s, a barrage of bi-yearly reports on the newest jets tested at
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Muroc Dry Lake filled the pages of the Los Angeles Times. Each topped the previous’
speed record, each more efficient, each a greater sign of American economic, intellectual,
and military dominance, each its own cause for celebration. Manifest Destiny was no
longer the cliffs of the Pacific but an invisible wall, the sound barrier. Chuck Yeager, in
1947, broke the barrier at Muroc; Mach 1 was a reality. The Times wrote in 1948 of the
previous year, “Speed was the key word for Southern California’s air year 1947.”143 Six
years later, a plane reached Mach 2. By 1961, Mach 6.144 Research aircraft pushing the
edge of American destiny a bit further came “on a fairly regular schedule” at Edwards.145
Edwards remained a single denomination site – strictly under military control
through the 1940s and 1950s. In its own right, though, the base came to be referred to as
a city.146 The remote location of Edwards is more a testament to the Air Force’s need for
a strategic test site. However, the base’s incredible importance in the Cold War years
was a testament to Los Angeles’ continuing emphasis of an “air-minded urban culture”
that coalesced with the military. Just miles south of Edwards, boosters built Palmdale
Airport and Air Force Plant 42 within just a few years after the wars ending. These
boosters brought the foundations for an urban populace into the desert, attracted to the
desert by its proximity to Edwards.147 These foundations went on to become the cities of
Palmdale and Lancaster and decentralizing industry even further – now embattled by a
changing national economy and dependence on the military industrial complex. Even in
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1949, before the expansion of Palmdale, Carey McWilliams was able to conclude,
“California has been driven, and will continue to be driven, to seek federal support.”148

Chapter 4
The Distant Suburb: Palmdale and the Partnership of Decentralization and Defense
Industry
“The future was always a hot commodity in Antelope Valley. When I was a boy, the
area was mostly talked about as the future home of the Palmdale International
Airport – a vast facility that would eventually replace dinky little LAX…By then,
greater L.A. would be so big, the Antelope Valley would be somewhere in the
Middle of town.”
-William Finnegan149
In June of 1996, forty-five years after John Anson Ford, county supervisor, and
General Fox dedicated Palmdale Airport, Sonia Nazario published two columns painteing
a grim picture of the American Dream’s grinding halt in Palmdale and the Antelope
Valley. The title of her first column, “Suburban Dreams Hit Roadblock,” set the stage.
She blamed plummeting real estate values and the advent of an imposed commuter
culture, thanks to scaled back production at nearby aerospace factories, for Antelope’s
agonizing state. Nazario explained that, an increase from years past, nearly half of
Antelope Valley residents commute, 30 percent for over two hours. She connected the
strains of a desert commute spent gliding along the Antelope Valley Freeway with the
alarming social and cultural problems plaguing the region.150
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However, Nazario fails to recognize the ironic twist of fates that have tangled
Palmdale’s dreams. Palmdale’s architects, building a city connected with Edwards Air
Force base and aerospace industry, never saw Palmdale as a suburb. Rather, Palmdale
was supposed to grow, becoming another peripheral hub for the Los Angeles regional
economy. Palmdale, as a hub, would develop to further the Angeleno residential staple
of single-family homes that are owned, not rented. Hand in hand with the military’s
needs for an ex-urban aerospace hub, based on contradicting arguments for
decentralization, Los Angeles County boosters, particularly Fox and Ford, placed an
airport in Palmdale with the explicit intention of the airport and Edwards Air Force Base
providing the basis for a new corner of growth. The Antelope Valley would have its own
residents, businesses, industry, service workers, and municipal facilities – each of these
contributing taxes to the county.151 The planning behind Palmdale was defined by ideas
about dispersion and decentralization established during the 1920s a hundred miles south
in the city’s traditional heart. Additionally, the city was a result of the pronounced
presence of aviation industry throughout the area but, during WWII, moved into the high
desert, also under the guide arguments about the need for decentralization.
John Anson Ford, in his memoir chronicling his time as a public official for the
county, placed Lancaster, another Antelope Valley city, and Palmdale squarely within the
county. He explained tactfully, “They enjoyed the economies and engineering benefits of
the county’s expert technical guidance.”152 However, he considered them distanced
“desert systems” too far removed to connect with typical county networks of
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sanitation.153 Ford, a driving figure behind the arrival of aerospace in Antelope country,
provided reflections that both emphasized the importance of aircraft factories in the
area’s growth and also defined them not as suburbs below a metropolis, but urban and
industrial hubs leeching off of a larger regional economy.154
Palmdale and Antelope Valley’s roots begin with a different notion of utopia.155
Westward migrating Swiss and German farmers settled Palmdale in1886. When drought
struck in the 1890s, only one family survived. In 1899, the family resettled next to the
new Southern Pacific railroad station.156
It is doubtful that, in 1913, when William Mulholland stood over the just
completed Los Angeles Aqueduct and said, “There it is. Take It,” that he had the drought
stricken German families of Palmdale in mind. However, the people of Palmdale, after
two decades of dust, were able to restore the town’s agriculture with the completion of
the aqueduct.157 Alfalfa became the valley’s primary commodity, a far cry from the
stealth bombers and fighter jets that have dominated the economy since 1950.158
Only gods and heroes can be brave in isolation. A man may call upon his courage
only one way, in the ranks with his brothers-in-arms, the line of his tribe and his
city. Most piteous of all states under heaven is that of a man alone, bereft of the gods
of his home and his polis. A man without a city is not a man. He is a shadow, a shell,
a joke, and a mockery…No one may expect valor from one cast out alone, cut off
from the gods of his home.
-Steven Pressfield159
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Palmdale’s factories, located about ten miles south of Edwards and ninety north
of Los Angeles are the prototypical examples of combining civic and public Angeleno
desires for dispersal and development with military industry, all in the name of urban
glory. Carey McWilliams, in the immediate aftermath of the drive to expand Palmdale’s
airport, addressed the relationship, “The spread-out, highly dispersed geographical
pattern of Los Angeles manufacturing happens to square with the modern trend toward
uncrowded, one-story manufacturing plants located on the periphery of built up areas.”160
A trend derivative of the 1920s, fear and loathing of crowded industry and urban
communities eclipsed any other way to define Los Angeles as a metropolis with the rise
of industry, thanks to the needs of war, on the periphery of the county.
Historian Roger W. Lotchin, in defining the relationship of war and defense with
urbanization, places Palmdale at odds with the centralized interests of the city, Los
Angeles. In many ways, it was – a distant desert beacon of industry that did little for the
city. This characterization overlooks the themes of decentralization, fears of a congested
metropolis that festered and arrived during the booming 1920s. Los Angeles’ factories,
from movies to aviation and rubber, never wanted neighbors, each receiving its own
segmented community, a sliver of the “earth worm,” the metaphor Jean Paul Sartre used
to describe the city. As L.A. growth hurtled outward, and population headed towards
inevitable increases after World War II, placing the next big airport, along with the next
vital aerospace manufacturing complex, away from current congestion seemed not only
logical, but an urban necessity to maintain what made Los Angeles grow in the past.
Palmdale was just beginning to enter the sphere of aerospace industry at the close
of WWII. Colonel William J. Fox, as director of the newly formed county Department of
160
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Aviation, set his sights on the Antelope Valley with the public intentions of developing
Palmdale Airport, now a civilian landing site, and soon to be revealed plans for an
engagement to Edwards and military industry.161 If Edwards Air Force base has its
patron military booster in Henry Arnold, Palmdale can look to canonize General Fox
integral in bringing Lockheed and the manufacturers that followed to Palmdale. In
recognition of Fox’s importance to their town, the people of Palmdale, not yet an
incorporated city, watched Fox grand marshal their Memorial Day parade in 1949.162
Plans to engineer the civilian airport, turned over to the County in 1946 after six
years of war service, into a trilateral industrial, civilian, and defense location, began long
before this. Airports as aviation industrial parks, rather than just airfields, was a common
theme throughout Metropolitan California – just as easily, these industrial theme parks
could be accommodated to include a defense presence.163 As early as 1947, months after
civilian leadership assumed control of the airport, the South Antelope Valley Press
reported on negotiations between Lockheed and the County on a potential lease of
Palmdale Airport property to the corporation.164 Aviation Week, in 1948, reported on
plans to expand the airport to 5,000 Acres and construct a massive 12,000 foot runway.
Not publicly announced by Fox at that point, it was still widely known that Lockheed
would be chosen as the private corporation spearheading development.165 In December
of 1949, the Counter Chamber of Commerce Board of Trustees approved a $300,000
construction product at the civilian airport transitioning to accommodate military
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presence and manufacturing. The building was an administrative center 100 miles north
of downtown, adjunct the Palmdale airport.166 The plans were symbolic of L.A.’s lack of
commercial center and traditional L.A. mythology, but also highlighted the critical
geographic and political alliances between business leaders and the military.
William Fox, collaborating with the Lancaster and Palmdale Chambers as well as
state assemblyman Julian Beck, presided over the groundbreaking of the administrative
building in 1950. He was well aware of the site’s future importance as not just a
municipal airport but also military and industrial establishment.167 Fox noted the long
process behind developing the air field and claimed that plans for a major air terminal in
Palmdale originated over twenty-five years prior. Fundamentally integrated with plans
for industrial and population growth at Palmdale, Fox cited agreements that set aside two
thousand acres for factory locations on the airport property, foreshadowing the imminent
federally financed Lockheed project.168 Fox and company did not officially make their
plans to make the airport an official military installation and Air Force plant public until
1952. However, the cultivation of the military relationship was longwinded, linking back
not just to explicit agreements made after the war but the importance of Edwards’
growing value during.
As a political move, the drive to develop Palmdale’s airport with military
contracts echoed desires for manufacturing. During WWII, boosters recognized that
manufacturing now often followed military testing. Military testing was often dependent
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on the presence of existing airports.169 Boosters were not going to make the same
mistake they had made in prewar years when they failed to finance significant municipal
airport expansions. In turn, county and local officials turned towards the new surplus
airport, a donation from the War Assets Administration.170 Lotchin explains, “Fox felt
that the county must have an ‘airport in being,’ ready for occupancy, or risk losing the
‘great game’ of industrial development to some other area in the Southwest.”171
Aviation Week, in August of 1948, reported on the planned “giant test center” for
Air Force jets at the county owned Palmdale Airport. The article cited Fox. He
explained that the plans called for developing the airport into the primary testing facility
for high-speed aircraft in the country.172 Fox asked the Board of Supervisors to fund the
site as a new jet airport, not as a field designed for propeller plans – an industry of the
past thanks to developments at Cal Tech and Edwards.173 The airport was attractive
because it was just ten miles from Edwards, the other testing site, and shared the same
environmental benefits.174 While no firms signed contracts to purchase land until 1950,
the county continued to purchase land around the newly acquired airport. Fox was sure
to keep the Air Force informed of these purchases as well.175 Just as the announcement
of Kaiser’s arrival in Fontana sparked a real estate boom, rumors of the county’s
purchases inspired a “mini-boom” in the Mojave.176
Palmdale’s location, a remote desert community largely outside Los Angeles’s
peripheral vision at this point, meshed with national and broader debates about industrial
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decentralization. Lotchin writes, “The Machiavellian maneuver to dispossess the central
Los Angeles region of some of its aerospace manufacturers could also be portrayed as a
means of defeating the cry of interior cities for decentralization.”177 The project,
however, still honored urban Los Angeles’ interests. Still within Los Angeles County, a
county that at one point L.A. boosters were intent on consolidating every square foot of
into Los Angeles proper, the project allowed aerospace to simultaneously leave and
remain in the Southland while creating a new manufacturing center.
Fox received most of the credit for developing the airport, but he acted within an
ecosystem that married business to aviation – allowing for the series of “Machiavellian
maneuvers” that brought aerospace out into the Valley.178 The Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce, a principled group in the area, demonstrated a policy of intimate involvement
with the Air Force and aviation. The Digest of Board of Trustees action from 1947-1952
revealed considerable attachment to the business of aviation and military contracts, taking
an official position that public policy was intertwined with the concerns of those that
represented Los Angeles industry and commerce.179 The Board frequently debated
national policy issues pertinent to the aerospace industry – from subsidizing municipal
airports to converting wartime Air Force and Navy outposts to permanent military bases.
In August of 1949, members decided to pursue bringing the soon to be founded Air Force
Academy to Los Angeles and launched an initiative to find a suitable location.180 The
“air minded urban culture” Lotchin identified as key in the arrival of aviation industry in
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the 1920s evolved to encompass both the military and the need for industrial
decentralization – driving urban growth throughout the postwar years.
Palmdale’s role as a capitol of aerospace directly derived from two projects: the
growth of Edward’s Air Force Base at the hands of the government and regionally pushed
civilian development of the Palmdale Airport. Eventually, the two grouped together,
sharing mutual interests. Edwards provided jobs, important in developing the urban
populace, but also imported themes on Palmdale’s cultural narrative, its top-secret
military aircraft “helped give the valley its futuristic sheen.”181
The partnership, implicit thanks to the work of men like Fox, united the their
causes under one project: Palmdales Airport was to become an aerospace theme park,
with industry, military, and municipal branches. In 1951, the Air Force purchased back
the airport and contracted Lockheed to develop a master plan for establishing a multi-use
Air Force plant and testing center on the site.182 In February of 1952, the County Board
of Supervisors formally announced the vote to turn the airport over to the Air Force.183
In ramping up progress, Lockheed appointed a coordinator for community development
to work with Antelope Valley officials as operations increased. Neil D. Smith, a Cal
Tech graduate, was selected.184
In the turnover, Fox, an urban booster as well as military man, faced opposition
from the Air Force. The non-local Air Force officers wanted Palmdale to turn completely
over to the military and become a base similar to Edwards. Fox, an urban booster hoping
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to construct an urban population around the site, wanted to airport to include a Palmdale
municipal presence and the capacity to operate civilian flights.185 While the generals
blocked the county’s call for civilian flights in 1951, the county acquired land back in the
1970s for civilian flights – a sign of the continuing and dynamic relationship between the
military and urban officials.186
The Air Force expected the facility to cost $50 million dollars, with $20 million
spent in the first year and half of construction.187 By March 1952, Lockheed, working
with L.A. county officials, had already begun operating at a new $400,000 hanger just
completed on site, paid for by the Air Force.188 Eighteen months later, the plant
employed 3,600 people.189 North American Aviation and Northrop Aviation later joined
Lockheed, the driving force behind the original contracts, at the facility. Deemed Air
Force Plant 42, the county seceded full control of the airport the Air Force in 1954 after
the county and Air Force approved Lockheed’s master plan for the site in 1953. Looking
to best capitalize on the investment, the Palmdale Chamber of Commerce chartered its
Palmdale Industrial Development Council in 1953 with the goal of settling incoming
manufacturing in the Valley – still largely vacant and unincorporated.190
The development of Air Force Plant 42 under military, industrial, and civilian
interests placed Palmdale within the trajectory of rooted decentralized development and
urban dispersal in the Southland. However, it also came to define the post-WWII
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political economy - industrialization and urbanization as dynamic processes determined
by both the city and the sword.
Even during the period, city municipal officials concerned themselves with these
transitions. Los Angeles’ Mayor Poulson, interviewed in 1955, said:
The city has plenty of space for growth as well as the county…We have about
2,225,000 in the city and the rest of the county has 2,275,000, including all the
cities that immediately adjoin Los Angeles like Burbank and Glendale and
Pasadena. You usually can’t tell the difference whether you’re in Los Angeles or
in one of these cities, except some change the style of numbering their streets.191
Poulson does not explicitly mention Palmdale, a fledgling city at this point, but it was not
long before an urbanized Palmdale came to resemble the already urbanized more central
cities. Poulson continued, foreshadowing the growth of Palmdale, arguing the city had
little limitations on its growth, postponing problems prevalent in Eastern cities.192 This
uninhibited urbanization, however, produced a bumper crop of its own problems.
While Poulson concerned himself more with the effects on Los Angeles proper,
the urban expansion of Los Angeles further away from the traditional had already
sparked a debate. By the mid 1950s, many recognized that they had filled up Los
Angele’ valley plain’s traditional borders – some envisioned a Los Angeles stretching
200 miles, well beyond the urban beginnings in Palmdale or Fontana.193 Officials
discussed a possible consolidation of businesses and population downtown, but the past
problems of such development returned to denounce such a plan – traffic, smog, and
congestion once again ruled urban planning discussions.194 The city’s downtown did
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expand, due to civic works and the growth of financial firms, but the periphery also
continued to press outwards. In this round of dispersal, the city pushed even farther into
the desert, perhaps to the area’s limits as one monolithic metropolitan economy. The
story of Palmdale illuminates the implications of that outward progression.

The pessimists who thought Los Angeles was headed for a big bust were misjudging
one set of facts…They expected Los Angeles to suffer more than most cities, in the
postwar recession, because it had grown so fast during the war. If the warworkers
stayed, there would be critical unemployment; if they went home, there would be
surplus housing in Los Angeles, layoffs in dry-cleaning plants, department stores,
and all the way through the retail and service lines”
-“The Undiscovered City”195
Most of the country, with the close of World War II began to prepare themselves
for a deceleration in things both economic and social. GIs returned homes and factories
closed, recession and strikes return. Each American city dealt with the close of the war
independently. Officials and boosters around the country sought to protect their local
interests. In Los Angeles these interests lay with the explosion of aviation industry and a
militarized economy. In a city blurring line between municipality and region, many
leaders began confronting the slower years of the peace dividend before victory was on
the horizon. Remarkably, Angelenos adapted to peacetime – dulling the blades of a
militarized economy to maintain production, research, and employment. Carey
McWilliams, surprisingly, noted in his 1949 monograph on the city that Los Angeles
filled 55 percent of the government’s orders for planes after the war, compared with 26
percent during the conflict.196
Employment in the aviation sectored did decrease immediately after the war and
the city turned to other industries, like apparel, in its reconverting to a peacetime
195
196

“The Undiscovered City.” Fortune, June, 1949.
McWilliams, Island on the Land, 225.

Bargmann 61
economy.197 Aviation companies, in 1949, only employed about a quarter of the
wartime peak.198 However, with the Korean War, Cold War, and emphasis on high tech
defense products, aviation boomed once again, this time in a partnership with missiles.
By 1952, aircraft and parts industry comprised 59 percent of all new manufacturing in the
county and 160,000 employees worked in the industry – returning the number to wartime
levels.199
Palmdale, today masquerading as a suburb sending people over the mountains to
work, had local labor shortages through the 1970s. When Lockheed was developing its
L-1011 Tristar, the company recruited workers from Burbank – offering packages of
relocation or company buses for daily commuters.200 The airport and Plant 42 urbanized
Palmdale. Edwards, by influencing industry to arrive at Palmdale, of course played a key
role as well. Urban growth did not occur on a significant level until the 1960s, but its
figurative roots lie in the 1920s.
The defense contracts that piled into Los Angeles reached incredible heights in
the postwar years. Prime contracts awarded in California during World War II, the
money paid directly by the Department of Defense to private companies, ranked third
with 8.7% of the total. New York led with 11%. By 1958, California captured 21% of
prime contracts. New York, second, still had only 11%.201 In dollar values, this
translated to 4.4 billion dollars, of the 20.4 billion total allocated, for California prime
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contracts.202 In reporting such numbers for California contracts, the state Chamber
postulated, “Private Industry in California continues to play its traditional role of
leadership in meeting the complex defense needs of the nation.”203 More importantly,
well over half of these companies, year after year, for decades, came to the Los Angeles
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regional basin.204 Federal money for civilian airports also arrived in the County.
California received about $4.5 million in federal money, of the $66 milion, appropriated
by Congress for the 1948 airport aid program. Of that $4.5 million, over $1.1 went to
airports in Los Angeles County.205
Southern California often contained the largest increase in new factories and plant
expansions, yearly, during the 1950s. Population increased at a higher rate in the region
relative to the rest of California. Los Angeles metropolitan area factory payrolls
accounted for 63% of state factory payrolls in 1956 – remaining around that number for
most of the decade.206 A 1958 report on state development highlighted prime contracts
that went towards capital investment rather than production of goods. The authors noted
the abundance of contracts with a favorable “rapid amortization” and credited their
presence booster politicking. The “steel mills, aircraft and parts firms, electronic, guided
missiles, machinery, and ordinance plants,” the report outlined, “rose to exceptional
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peaks in early 1950s and were concentrated in Southern California.”207 On a national
level, by 1954 Los Angeles surpassed Detroit as the country’s third largest manufacturing
center. The state chamber of commerce, in its annual blue book, attributed this ranking,
among other things, to the county’s development of aviation manufacturing during the
War.208 Palmdale, a prominent fixture of the defense related economy, developed within
a broader environment created by the boosters. However, urban Palmdale, founded
solely on the booster’s marriage of decentralization and defense spending, would later
face a greater economic burden with the peace dividend.
Los Angeles represents the urban implications of federal money doled out by the
Department of Defense. However, scholars have also noted the more subtle ways federal
money has trickled throughout the metropolis during the post New Deal years. Urban
theoriest Edward Soja, in particular, while not quite as critical as Davis, calls Los
Angeles “the prototypical Keynesian state-city, a federalized metro-sea of state rescued
capitalism.”209 Juxtaposed against what seems to be irreconcilable claims that Los
Angeles is the ultimate free market, capitalist urban body, these notions paint the
complex narrative that is not just Los Angeles’ own history and economics, but also the
historiography and frameworks that have been developed to study the region.
Soja underscores the prevalence of federal programs that subsidized a brand of
consumption in almost organic synergy with Angeleno capitalism – in particular the
bureaucracy behind housing, transportation, and water development.210 In Los Angeles,
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even before the advent of the 1950s, single-family housing shifted from a desired good
into the norm.211 Palmdale, and its housing developments pouring out over the desert,
enriched by federally funded irrigation projects and mortgages paid by aerospace federal
contracts, represented one unraveling of such an injection of the military industrial
complex. World War II provided, or is at least perceived to, a watershed period that
militarized Los Angeles industry and Keynesianized the region. However, the stories of
Muroc and Palmdale, as well as industry throughout the region, were not necessarily
produced by the war, they are continuities of economic and political traditions long
rooted in the city.
During World War II, there was, nevertheless, a major shift for Los Angeles
industry. This was not a shift of material or goal – aviation had long been present in L.A.
and only increased in breadth and technology. Rather, for the first time on a large scale,
L.A. industry fundamentally linked itself to national interests of the federal government.
No longer were just individual Angeleno boosters forming a collective to advance their
city, they now could attach their urban environment to national politics in significant
ways. Edwards is a clear example of this process. Palmdale is a slightly more
homegrown instantiation on the periphery, but still falls within this tradition. Cal Tech,
and its associated characters like Theodore von Karman, were even more connected.
After all, it was Hap Arnold that approached von Karman, then a Cal Tech scientist, in
1944 to serve on the soon to be established Scientific Advisory Group, later Board, to the
Air Force.212 The Los Angeles Times endorsed the need to develop supercarriers and
nuclear-powered submarines on a national level because those were products in which
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their “urban futures” depended.213 Palmdale founding fathers placed the city alongside
military industry. Occurring at the same time as the federal government began to
subsidize the aircraft industry to develop not only combat planes, but also cargo and
transport aircraft, Palmdale’s boosters further developed Los Angeles urban air minded
culture and sought out federal money for aviation. 214 This established a practice of
designing and constructing civilian and military transports together, paralleling the larger
confluence of civilian urban growth, that emphasized decentralization, as it related to
military strategy and defense related industries.215
Aggregating and analyzing twenty years of growth for Palmdale and the Antelope
valley, the Palmdale City Council and Planning commission released a master plan for
the city in 1968. Palmdale’s population was only 20,000 in Palmdale and the Anteleop
Valley’s only 110,000. However, Palmdale’s population, in the ten years after Plant 42
opened grewk by 500%. 86% of the houses within Palmdale proper had been constructed
in the previous fifteen years. Massive growth continued through the 1990s, the new
transplants continued to give the same reasons for moving – “less crime, less congestion,
less smog, cheaper housing.”216 Giving credit where due, the Palmdale City report
registered the area’s critical shift towards aviation industry in the years after World War
II and associated the growth at a fundamental level with defense related employment.217
Palmdale developed as an “independent urban center,” the council argued, but
strongly added that its distance to Los Angeles was a factor in the areas social and
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economic evolution. In the coming decades, Palmdale would come to be considered part
of the L.A. regional area. The council concluded their report with an account of the
recent county decision to incorporate the Palmdale Airport, now leased for civilian flights
and jet-testing, as a major civilian aviation hub for the region.218
In one sense, with a local and narrow view, World War II and defense projects
defined and produced Palmdale’s growth. World War II undoubtedly provided a
transformative environment for the agricultural village to begin transforming into an
industrial city – out of these beginnings sprung Plant 42 and Edwards. However, by
assuming a perspective based on decade long Angeleno beliefs about urban dispersal,
Palmdale represents the newest frontier of urbanization and industrialization for the city.
World War II therefore catalyzed the ongoing growth beyond the archaic city borders that
later characterized Los Angeles as a regional metropolitan economy rather than contained
urban city. Neither of these viewpoints is a contradiction or incorrect. Instead, they
illuminate the two sides of a relationship that urban boosters and the federal military
forged together. This relationship can create both marked problems and transform the
process of urbanization.
The implications of this relationship came to fruition during the 1990s and are
still felt today. While the city’s population has continued to grow, the economy falterd.
Recession created a web of social and political problems derivative of the larger changes
in the urban industrial economy. Beginning in 1990, the region’s economy began to slow
due to cutbacks in the aerospace industry. Los Angeles County lost more half a million
jobs, but Antelope Valley was hit particularly hard. Housing prices dropped 50 percent.
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The area’s primary employers, for forty years, had been Edwards, Lockheed, and
Rockwell – all aerospace companies. Before the end of the Cold War, a high school
graduate from Palmdale High could easily acquire a job with Lockheed and Rockwell
and earn $16 and hour after only a few years of work. If that same graduate chose to stay
in the valley after 1990, their best options for jobs became in the service industry – “at
Taco Bell or in telemarketing.”219
William Finnegan, in his Cold New World, called a “status report on the
American Dream,” wrote, “The imploded local economy had changed everything for
many of the valley’s kids….the Cold War was over and the aerospace and defense jobs
were not coming back.” The previous generation came to Antelope and found an
affordable single family home and a fair, stable pay check, the aspirations of their
children were much different. He wrote, “For three years running, when asked about
their post-graduation goals, more than 90 percent of Kennedy’s seniors had proclaimed
their first ambition to be getting out of the Antelope Valley.”220 Aware, just like Nazario
and Finnegan, that living in Palmdale as if it was a suburb, necessary after local
aerospace’s, demise only lead to further troubles. The future, and theirs, was not located
in the high desert – breaking away from the tradition of earlier boosters, pilots, and
generals.
Located 60 miles southeast of Palmdale, Fontana, a city void of any aviation
industry, parallels the arc of Palmdale – an agrarian community urbanized by rooted
industrial development catalyzed by World War II and the rise of the military industrial
complex. Equally dependent on industry developed during World War II, changes in the
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American economy since have required the city’ officials and people to adapt and find a
new form of economic sustenance.
Chapter 5
From Farm to Forge: Fontana and the Industrialization of Los Angeles’ Periphery
“If I’m against development, then I’m a hypocrite. As farmers we created the model
for this type of growth. We came here, ripped apart the native desert landscape, and
continually tried to increase our yield per acreage. It’s essentially the business
model for any suburban development.”221
-Matthew Moore, farmer
A city of almost 200,000, Fontana’s economic lifeblood is, now, predominantly
post-industrial and post-fordist. The city engulfs key highway junctures. The Interstate
10, 15, and State Route 210 run through the area, gridding off a landscape for trucking
based industries – industrial sales, storage centers, and product distribution warehouses.
Located in an unincorporated area just outside the city, the Auto Club Speedway, lying
upon the foundations of the original Steel Mill, provides a vital attraction to the city – a
boon for the service economy located amongst the city’s many strip malls and shopping
centers. Oddly enough, the city’s largest employer, in 2009, still bore the name of
Kaiser. However, rather than a steel mill emblematic of the blue collar, middle class,
California industrial dream, it is a Kaiser-Permanente Hospital that claims the largest
chunk of the city’s labor force.222
Since its incorporation in 1952, but more so in recent years, boosters have sold
Fontana as a low cost suburban city – where jobs and a house were the basic tenets of
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residency. However, like of the rest of the Inland Empire, Fontana’s housing market
plummeted during the national foreclosure crisis. Witness to a flurry of new housing
developments, the subprime mortgage crisis drove median prices for both new and
existing housing down to 2004 levels by the 2010 fiscal year.223 Fontana, along with
other areas in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, and the Antelope valley, were no
strangers to distressed real estate. The grim numbers of 2007 through the present, David
Streitfield notes in the Los Angeles Times, do not eclipse the 1990s housing crises – a
time when boarded up houses in Fontana were just as common as pit crews.224
Fontana, as just one part of the Inland Empire, defined as San Bernardino County,
Riverside County, and parts of eastern Los Angeles County, only grew into a significant
urban and residential community in the post World War II years. Fontana’s identity, like
Palmdale’s, identity as a once industrial hub and now a depreciating, but aspiring
affordable, post-fordist suburb, has much more tangible roots in the changes brought to
Southern California by World War II. Before a suburb, Fontana became an industrial
center.
In 1942, the agrarian community was “abruptly reshaped to accommodate the
dream of a Rooseveltian industrial revolution in the West.” Henry Kaiser, working in
hand with the forces and trends of New Deal Keynesianism and wartime mobilization,
spurred the arrival of an industrial workforce. Kaiser Steel, in a1942 pamphlet
announcing the plans for a steel mill, portrayed the attack on Pearl Harbor as not just an
attack on a nation, but also a call to arms of firearms and furnaces:
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On December 7, 1941 the village of Fontana was bathed in California’s winter
sunshine…Then the bombs crashed in far Hawaii, and their explosions were
echoed and re-echoed by the roaring and hammerings of America’s furnaces,
factories, and workshops, gearing for the production of weapons and all the
accoutrements of war.225
The village, the pamphlet, explained, was about to become a vital location for the war
effort – simultaneously protecting democracy across the world and developing the
farming community into a leading symbol of industrial prosperity among the developing
West.226 Importantly, echoing calls from the rise of Lockheed and Muroc, Kaiser Inc.
explained the factory should not be seen as a “war baby,” rather as the fruits of the
inevitable pregnancy birthing continuous Western growth.227 To the contrary, the
corporation could not help but romanticize the factory’s construction in the context of a
burgeoning “arsenal of democracy,” writing, “On April 6, 1942 the pigs and piglets
rooted their last root on the farm at Fontana, and before the last squeal had died away it
was drowned by the rattle and bang of a mighty construction project.”228 In retrospect,
even with the steel mills downsizing, San Bernardino, in a postwar planning commission,
could not help but regard its growth into a metropolitan area as “war winnings” in the
same way similar commissions were torn between calling Palmdale’s growth a product of
or paralleling symptom, both the cause of California capitalism.229
Sixty miles east of Los Angeles, and well enough removed from the peripheral
wealth of Pasadena and Claremont, Fontana was an inconspicuous and remote
agricultural desert community before the war. Within a few decades of Muroc and
Palmdale’s founding, A. B. Miller, an entrepreneur and farmer, began working to plant
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the beginnings of Fontana. A forgotten name when compared to the other real estate and
business figures of the Southland, like William Mulholland and George Chaffey, Miller
was a prominent figure in the agricultural development of several rural desert
communities and a student at Pomona College for one year. Mike Davis, a Fontana
native, profiled the city in the final chapter for his 1992 City of Quartz and critiqued the
capitalist forces that left the city a “junkyard.”230 Davis, of Miller, writes, “He was a
brilliant real-estate promoter who fully grasped the combination of advertising and
infrastructure required to alchemize the dusty plains of the San Bernardinos into gold.”231
Cornelius De Bakcsy, the founder of the Fontana Herald, wrote in his history of the city,
“It was that man who had the vision to turn this huge waste land to great fruit, poultry,
and live stock farm, to make the desert into a garden spot of the southland.”232
In 1906, after success as a developer of a canal in the Imperial Valley, Miller was
able to purchase the majority interest in the Fontana Development Company from the San
Francisco Savings Union.233 In purchasing the company, Miller and his associates took
ownership of approximately 20,000 acres of land – soon to become Fontana.234 Over the
next years, Miller undertook an ambitious project to irrigate the company’s land. Before
1913, but really beginning in 1909, Miller began to intensively develop the property.235
In preparing for planting, Miller applied his knowledge of irrigation and agriculture to
ready the land – building a 3,600 feet long tunnel along the edges of Lytle Creek and
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shafts to create a subterranean reservoir.236 In total over $1,500,000 was spent on the
irrigation system.237 As spring arrived in 1910, Miller’s Fontana Development Company
began to plant. In the next three years, they had planted over 1,000 acres of orange and
lemon trees, along with half a million-eucalyptus trees planned to serve as windbreakers
for the land.238
After a reorganization of the Fontana Company and the Fontana Land and Water
Company, on June 7th, 1913, the town officially opened. A crowd of 4,000 gathered to
hear Miller’s own mother speak and break a bottle of Fontana’s own grape juice on the
base of the town’s flagpole.239 Judge Bledsoe presided over the festivities and opened
with, “There is just one person to whom the people here assembled are more obligated
than they are to Blanchard Miller, to whose genius for organization and whose faith in the
future, today’s results may be traced…and that one person is Mrs. Eliza B. Miller, the
mother of Blanchard Miller.” Mrs. Miller, in a quick toast after cracking the bottle on
the flagpole explained her son had “done that great service of making two blades of grass
grow where but one grew before.”240
While it would soon separate itself from the pack, Fontana was just one of many
“irrigation colonies” in the valley. More successful than those of the high desert in
Antelope Valley, the beginnings of today’s inland empire suburbs began with citrus
franchises. Fontana, Redlands, Claremont, and Ontario all were desert communities
twisted by man to be bountiful plots of oranges and other crops brought capital, labor,
and urban foundations to the area.
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However, Fontana, Davis argues, presented a unique interpretation to citrus
capitalism. Miller and his Fontana Company both brought in corporate agriculture with
Fontana Farms, a massive pig farm that in 1925 was the biggest in the world, but also
segmented the property into smaller holdings.241 Fontana Farms aimed these plots for the
masses, foreshadowing the mass market and consumer economy that Kaiser Steel would
capitalize on in the 1940s, catapulting Fontana into a suburb of identical housing
development around a race track, rather than farms around a hog pen.
Miller’s Fontana grew into a peripheral farming community where Los Angeles’
garbage was sold to feed pigs. Poultry, later, joined hog and tree crops as a presence in
Fontana. By 1930, there were 3,000 small farms under Miller’s Fontana plan and 900
poultry plants.242 The number of families running poultry farms had increased from ten
to over 500 during the 1920s.243 Growth slowed during the 1930s, but, as with other
agricultural establishments in California, depression brought new faces and changes.
Ernest Cadwell, the historian that compiled the local history for the Fontana Chamber of
Commerce, himself came to Fontana from Chicago during depression. He wrote:
It was June, 1934 when I saw a small advertisement of the Fontana Farms Co. in a
Chicago paper. I telephoned Mr. Post, the local real estate agent, who called on
us promptly and showed us some alluring pictures of Fontana. Then he offered to
take us to Fontana.244
Four years later, Fontana celebrated its “silver anniversary.” 7,000 people, living in
2,000 homes now called the town home.245 A.B. Miller addressed the crowd during the
three-day jubilee. He said:
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A new era for Fontana can be visualized, as this community can and will become
not only one of the most outstanding farming and residential sections of this part
of the Southland, but also should share in the industrial developments which
should come to this valley. To pave the way for this bright future, we must
cooperate wholeheartedly and wisely, keeping our eyes and arms open.246
The budding agricultural “colony,” thanks to the influence of a local breed of L.A.
developmental doctrine, was poised to mold around the coming industrial and urban
transformations that would synthesize a new landscape for the Los Angeles region during
and after World War II.
“Then came the war, then came a multitude of new people – men who were hunting
for jobs found that jobs were hunting men.”
-Ernest Cadwell in his History of Fontana247
Outside the county borders, Fontana and the arrival of its steel mill were key
developments not just for the rural desert, but the entire metropolitan area. In many
ways, Fontana was an afterthought for the aviation and oil industrialists that had already
made their mark by 1940. However, the steel mill’s presence forced the town’s name
into the vernacular of Los Angeles boosters, politicians, and businessmen. Before Kaiser

had publicly announced Fontana as the location for the first Western steel plant, steel was
a prominent topic. With wartime mobilization, a policy that began before official
declaration in December 1941, the notion that a local steel mill was necessary to
underwrite the continuing growth of the area’s manufacturing became commonplace
among boosters and politicians.248
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For years, Los Angeles power figures had enveloped themselves in a narrative of
urban development that pitted their city against the East – an us and them binary that
established a competition of urban growth and eventually spread to infect the relationship
between all Western cities.249 The entire West Coast felt they remained an economic
colony of the east.250 Forced to import steel, and other raw goods at high markups over
thousands of miles, businessmen across the state, from Kaiser to Douglas, felt a need to
define the area as an autonomous manufacturing base. Simultaneously though, but
naturally for the city, Los Angeles was able to capitalize on the need for the West to
import all its raw materials. The southern city served as a transportation hub for raw and
manufactured goods. A 1940 report on the city’s growth explained the importance of
this, “Los Angeles by virtue of its great distance from eastern manufacturing centers
traded on the margin in transportation rates between manufactured goods and basic
materials, serving the western consumer market at a competitive advantage over eastern
manufacturers.”251
For the city’s boosters, it was the differences they found in their built landscape
that defined many of their arguments for Los Angeles exceptionalism. As early as 1925,
Sherley Hunter in his sprawling argument for the inevitability of Los Angeles’ greatness,
wrote, “Los Angeles has planned well – known that, some day, the disconsolate world
would turn faces from the jostle and smoke and congestions of less favored environments
and come to her.”252 As industry, in particular the aviation industry, did in fact turn
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towards Los Angeles, the city and its planners, needing to maintain urban decongestion,
further pushed the urban borders. In a particularly prescient bit, Hunter wrote, again, not
in 1942, but 1925:
When the hundred-mile radius is filled to a comfortable convenience, for factory
and work and transportation, the radius will take on another fifty miles or so, the
circle will, constantly, remain a metropolitan district reaching almost to San
Diego and up to the San Jacinto mountains – another network of motor roads,
electric lines, air-navigation landing fields, ware-housed – and always a mingling
of agriculture and fruit-growing with industrial establishments and everyone
enjoying the year round outdoor climate and healthfulness.253
Fontana fit this understanding of growth perfectly. Miller’s dual agricultural community,
both yeoman and corporate, was a friendly match for a Los Angeles decentralization that
was coming to demand, or at least its boosters, a local steel mill to source the raw
material necessary for the area’s factories.
Long before the war, Kaiser discussed with other California capitalists the ways
in which the states, but particularly Los Angeles’ economy, could still grow. The figures
included A.P. Gianni, founder of Bank of America and Kaiser’s primary backer as he
lead the conglomerate of construction companies behind the Hoover Dam, steel mogul
Stephen Bechtel, and airplane man Donald Douglas.254 Kaiser was a complicated figure,
seemingly contradictory, an entrepreneur fully aware of the New Deal Order and its
opportunities. A stalwart Republican, Kaiser “avidly” supported the New Deal. Forbes,
posthumously in 1986, declared he “symbolized American Capitalism at its best” because
of his ability to build a ship a day, in response to government demand, and establish an
industrial empire of raw goods, often financed by government loans and subsidies.255
Kaiser, riding the New Deal, maintained popular labor practices – installing daycares in
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his Richmond factories and distributing high-wages as a basic tenet of his
industrialism.256 “A hero of the West,” Davis wrote, “Kaiser personified the spirit of the
war-generated high productivity, high-wage economy that later economic historians
would refer to as Fordism.”257
At first, Kaiser focused on the demand a war in the Pacific would create for ships
– installing mass production assembly at his Richmond shipyards. However, when a
shortage of steel plate slowed the creation of his liberty ships, Kaiser became involved in
the creation of a West coast steel mill. This interest further incubated Kaiser’s role in the
Los Angeles economy. Kaiser proposed, not by happenstance, to borrow federal money
to build a steel mill in the Los Angeles area and use power from the Hoover dam to drive
the furnaces.258 For months, before the panic of Pearl Harbor, Fontana had clamored for
a munitions or aircraft factory.259 Miller and his crew of agricultural pioneers had passed
away just that year and the next crop of Fontana boosters looked to war industry to
further the small community. Confident that wartime demand could be converted into a
booming postwar market, Kaiser accepted a $110 million loan from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.
Kaiser chose Fontana for reasons that seemed at odds with each other. It was
simultaneously in a military strategic location located away from the coast, but not too far
enough away to not be considered an industrial cornerstone of the almost complete Los
Angeles metropolitan manufacturing behemoth.260 Cadwell dated the announcement to
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late 1941 or early 1942 – just weeks into the war but months into mobilization efforts by
New Deal veterans Kaiser and his associates. In true Angeleno fashion, the proclamation
that the steel mill would be built in Fontana sparked a land grab as real estate along Sierra
Ave, the main business thoroughfare.261
As the torch passed from Miller to Kaiser, one dreamer to another, Fontana
underwent “sensational” transformation and growth.262 For the Los Angeles area,
defined broadly, the arrival of steel was sensational not for the growth it brought – this
was no new occurrence – but the industrial autonomy it symbolized. With the advent of
Western steel, subsidized and financed by a federal government determined to furnish the
arsenal of democracy, the region free itself of dependence on East for the barest of
manufacturing essentials.263 While Los Angeles officials and boosters would continue to
argue that their metropolis was overlooked or undervalued as an industrial center for
years to come, the Fontana plant, fully underwritten by the federal government, along
with mill in Provo, Utah built during the war, became symbols of a new Western
industrial epoch.264
Kaiser and his steel company defended their choice of Fontana as a deliberate
calculation. They recognized, in a perfect fit with Angeleno boosters, the incredible
business opportunity posed by the vacancy of local steel. Writing in a 1942 promotional
pamphlet, entitled “Desert Harvest,” Kaiser public relations noted the “branch” character
of Western cities – acting as distributors of raw goods rather than producers.265 In
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bringing a Kaiser Steel Mill to Southern California, “the world’s fastest growing market,”
a new era of manufacturing began in the eyes of Kaiser and Company:
The dawn is now rising on a new empire – an industrial empire for the West.
Built on foundation of Western steel, from Western ore, it promised a new ear of
prosperity as Western industry grows and as Eastern industry shifts it factories
beyond the rockies.266
Fontana was to become an unlikely throne, of many, to this industrial empire. Henry
Kaiser explicitly sought out a community that could support an industrial factory as well
as continued agricultural growth. Victory was not just for the allies, but also for the “sunspangled Pacific…where manufacture and husbandry go hand in hand.”267 Jack L.
Ashby, the general manager of the Fontana Plant and a Vice President for Kaiser Steel,
explained that Kaiser often placed his factories in agricultural communities where his
industry could compliment the farms in a partnership of mutual prosperity.268
Additionally, Fontana offered cheap water and power, thanks to Miller, and very
convenient rail connections – the San Bernardino and Colton rail yards were nearby as
well.269
In 1952, reflecting on the ten year anniversary of the factory, Ashby used the
same arguments as the metropolitan boosters and businessmen of Los Angeles in their
quest for development. He said, in an address at a local Industrial Conference, “Mr.
Kaiser…. [was] impressed by the growth possibilities of San Bernardino valley itself.
The large areas available for development meant that future growth would not be retarded
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by industrial and population congestion.”270 While Miller’s Fontana may have been
distant and removed from Los Angeles’ urban identity, that gap eventually disappeared as
the metropolitan economy grew to require yet another industrial hub. With the security
requirement of the war further emphasizing industrial decentralization, Miller’s Fontana,
with its unique blend of corporate agriculture and middle class yeoman, became an
obvious extension of the city’s sprawl. Just over a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor,
Fontana’s main furnace, nicknamed “Big Bess,” was turned on. By May of 1943, the
plant celebrated its first steel. While supply costs for Fontana remained high, the plant
produced steel at incredibly rates that far exceeded expectations.271
Along with the aircraft factories and military bases in the Southland, Fontana and
Kaiser did not intend to downsize after the war. Ernest Cadwell explained that many in
Fontana expected Kaiser’s entrepreneurial work in Fontana to stop. Instead the steel
industry, and Fontana with it, continued to expand.272 Federal political interests, in
particular, representatives from California, hijacked the issue of Kaiser’s RFC loans.
After the war, after repaying part of the loan, Western industrialists and politicians
supported Kaiser in his attempt to have some of the debt written off in exchange for
lower steal prices. Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce President Kenneth T. Norris,
after Kaiser agreed to lower prices, led a lobbying effort for Kaiser Steel in Washington
D.C. after Kaiser agreed to agreed to rethink his steel prices. Substantial refinancing
never occurred at the magnitude Kaiser of Norris desired, but there efforts did not go
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unheard in the federal government as it developed a prominent relationship with West
coast steel and the aviation industry.273
Two postwar expansions were added to the Fontana plant and Kaiser repaid the
original RFC loan, after the years of attempted, refinancing, in 1950. In a turn away from
New Deal and wartime loans, Kaiser steel repaid the initial 1942 RFC investment and
financed the expansions privately by selling bonds, increased credit from the everfriendly A.P. Gianni and his Bank of America, and selling more equity.274
The plant employed 5,700 people in 1950 and would grow to a labor force of over
6,000 with the new expansions. The Fontana plant, and Kaiser Steel, reacted directly to a
growing market for West Coast steel. In 1940, the western states consumed 2,500,000
tons of steel. In 1951, those same states consume 6,000,000 tons and only 3,600,000 was
being produced in the West.275 Ashby, as the spokesperson for Kaiser steel and the
Western economic empire at the San Bernardino Industrial Conference in 1952, saw no
near contraction to the steel bubble. He said:
The Pacific Coast has a long way to go just to catch up with the rest of the country
in the per capita consumption of steel. Last year the nation as a whole consumed
1,036 pounds of steel per person, while here in the seven western states we
consumed only 718 pounds of steel per person.276
Fontana agriculture had also benefited, at least in terms of numbers, from the plant.
Farming production increased from $39 million to $106 million from 1941-1951.277 The
New Yorker wrote, “Manufacturers of everything from steel file cabinets to steel buckets
to chain-link fences grew up around Fontana, and so did large machine shops that
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serviced steelmaking equipment.”278 In the transition to peacetime, like much of Los
Angeles, Fontana was able to sustain a golden age of seemingly eternal booms.
Within forty years of the wars closing, Fontana’s industrial mantelpiece was no
longer heralded as a throne of a Western empire, but now an “American Tragedy.”279
However, during its transition from war to peace, as the steel mill still employed the city
and produced the raw goods necessary for various manufacturers around the basin,
Fontana came to settle as a peripheral industrial establishment within the Los Angeles
metropolitan area. With historic Route 66 running just north of the furnaces and stable
and high paying jobs offered by Kaiser employing 50% of the city’s workforce during the
Korean War, Fontana became emblematic of the postwar suburban ideal in which a job
and house became fundamental rights.280 Kaiser chose Fontana in 1942 and envisioned
such progress. Jack Asbhy, in his famous 1952 address, spoke with a confidence – the
plant was linked with the community’s narrative by more than just historical context or
coincidence.281 The local boosters and Kaiser Steel developed Fontana into a utopian
decentralized community with both suburban staples and an industrial infrastructure.
In 1956, the plant again expanded. Increasing production of ingot and finished
steel by 40%, the $113 million expansion program began long after Korean War demand
but still introduced a state of the art Basic Oxygen Furnace – the last technological
upgrade for fifteen years at Fontana.282 Blue collar Fontana pushed the American Dream
even further, becoming an ever-desirable suburb beneath ever growing Los Angeles.
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Union leaders were often seen playing golf; steelworkers spent their leisure time on
tennis courts or racing in the Mojave.283 Fontana, with it agrarian roots, industrial
behemoth, and egalitarian capitalist suburban identity – all either derivative of Southern
Californian boosterism or militarized demand and federal spending – became a fresh
prototype of the new American Dream. This iteration was steeped simultaneously in the
tradition and opportunism of old, but had co-opted the importance of industry and
modernity thanks to the economic stimulus provided by World War II and its related
militarization. All of these things made Angelenos proud to place Fontana within the Los
Angeles Metropolitan Area. Even eastern steel looked on with admirations, Pennsylvania
steel workers believed that Kaiser’s plant, in prosperous California, was “recessionproof.”284 Fontana was a distant suburb well incorporated into decentralized urban
sprawl and simultaneously a vital industrial foundation for the sprawling economy.
Palmdale occupied a similar role, one degree closer to the military industrial
process with its airplane factories and direct military presence. Both cities owe the
culmination of their industrialization and urbanization to World War II, but the form of
that industrialization was a product of the booster’s tradition of decentralization and
dispersal. Fontana and Pamldale are rich stories – representative of the results of a
partnership between the booster’s concerns about decentralization with defense related
industry. Both communities, as the nation’s economy and demand for defense products
changed, shrunk as prominent examples of post war urban progress in Los Angeles.
They drifted back outside the periphery, alone dependent on their fragile and failing
economies for rejuvenation.
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Regardless, to look at that first satellite picture was a revelation, a way to remove
myself from the city's piecemeal chaos, to pull back the lens. Still, for all that this
allowed me to imagine L.A. as part of a larger landscape, a carpet of gray grid
extending from the ocean to the mountains, with small tendrils of urbanization
creeping though the passes to nourish ancillary offshoots in the San Gabriel Valley
and the Inland Empire, it also revealed another sort of chaos, the formless growth of
a megalopolis in which development filled every corner like a kind of moss.285
-David L. Ulin
The Kaiser Steel Mill in Fontana began a decline of almost too perfect a fit for the
broader strokes of de-industrialization in the United States. Inverse to Kaiser Steel’s
decline was the rise of Japanese steel, beginning in the mid 1960s. Kaiser, at first, also
benefited from increased Japanese demand for steel and increased American demand
during the Vietnam War. However, as Kaiser lagged in meeting demand, Japan began to
develop a prominent steel industry of its own, “able to confiscate all the Vietnam-boom
growth in Western steel demand.”286
By 1976, steel profits had gone into the red and, with the rising concern of smog,
expensive mandates were imposed on the Fontana plant. Originally, the Kaiser family
engaged in selling Fontana to Nippon Kokan KK, the world’s fifth largest steelmaker at
the time. The deal collapse and the continuing years of recession, these under Paul
Vockler and Reagan’s high interest rates, sent a shockwave through America steel –
essentially beginning of a nationwide purge.287
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Kaiser Steel then sold iron ore possession in Australia and resources in Canada
“to help feed the money-gobbling steel operation.”288 Stephen Girard, a former Kaiser
Steel chairman described it as “selling your tiara to raise food money.”289 Even the
boosters began to change their opinions about the factory. While worried about the loss
of jobs, San Bernardino County leaders were also eager for the anticipated increase in
real estate value the closing of the factory, a huge producer of pollution, could
stimulate.290
In 1983, Kaiser Steel closed its doors as a steel producer – in October, 1983 the
last ore was smelted into steel in Fontana.291 Shuttering the $12 million-a-moth draining
business opened the doors to a financial bidding war for the company’s remaining
“undervalued assets.” Irwin Jacobs of Minnesota, J.A. Frates of Oklahoma, and Monty
Rial, masquerading as a coal baron from Colorado, entered the fray. Rial, who “suddenly
appeared, uninvited and unknown” and in actuality had produced no steel from his
holdings, borrowed money from Bank of America to finance a takeover of Kaiser.292 The
bank that, due to the partnership of Giannia and Kaiser, had once served as both a
defensive and expansive line of credit for Fontana was now being used to purchase, and
then sell off the plant.
After the bidding war, Rial agreed to a joint buyout of Kaiser with Frates. He
eventually also bought out Frates share. This deal required the re-leveraging of Fontana
and Kaiser to finance the buyout. Under Rial, and with the Fontana Mill dark, Kaiser
focused on its coal industry. However, the company was “virtually worthless.” Rial was
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pushed out of a leadership position in 1986 and 1987, three years after the plant’s closing
laid off the Fontana workers. By 1986, all they had left were Kaiser Steel shares, then
valued at less than $2 a share. The steelworkers without federally insured pensions living
in a community that’s value to the broader L.A. economy came from its steel industry,
had “seen millions of dollars evaporate.”293 Riall, in contrasts, took $2.4 million in salary
in 1985.294 The New York Times proclaimed the mill had become “a symbol of
wrenching changes in the economy, its roaring furnaces burdened by international
competitions, environmental regulations, labor disputes, and the encroachments of
corporate raiders.”295
The remaining shareholders sold the company to Bruce Hendry, a Minnesota
financier infamous as a “scrap dealer in distressed companies.”296 Hendry canceled
between 5,000 and 6,000 former employees’ health coverage and pension plans.297
Workers and their families began to leave Fontana in significant numbers. The cheaper
real estate attracted residential developers, though, beginning to transition Fontana to a
commuter-based city, not unlike what Palmdale experienced after the downsizing of its
factories in the 1990s.298 For Davis, this exodus, similar to Lockheed’s in Palmdale,
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began a decline that turned Fontana into a scene from Mad Max, “a post-apocalyptic
society of industrial scavengers and metal vultures.”299
There is little doubt the closing of the Fontana mill hurt the town. Jobs, without
pension, disappeared. Real estate plummeted. Financially, the city has suffered. The
abandoned steel site was used to film a TV movie called “Hiroshima.”300 But perhaps
most telling is Victor Volhardt’s, a capitalist now part of Fontana’s semi-rejuvenation,
take on the affect. He said, in an interview on Fontana industry since the closing:
This was a close-knit community, when people worked around here," "But the
politicians drove local businesses out, because people don't like to be around
industry, and replaced them with all these malls and fast-food places and what
have you, and forced people to drive into L.A. to work, and when people have
spent three hours in the car they don't go to PTA meetings and communityoriented things-and so the community falls apart.301
This idea is not far from the arguments made about the root of Palmdale’s recent crisis.
Just as in Fontana, the loss of the primary manufacturing source in a peripheral hub
reverberates through the community – evident in decreased paychecks, increased
commutes, and changing family dynamics. Dependence on a meager service economy is
not sufficient in developing a self-sustainable economic unit, forcing residents to opt for
jobs elsewhere.
Davis, a resident of Fontana, is a product of a city that vividly remembers the
plants decline and the ensuing implications on its local life and role as a broader fixture
of the Angeleno Economy. Ernst Cadwell, the founding editor of the Fontana Daily
Herald, was an immigrant to and resident of a different Fontana. As Davis remembers
distressed real estate, Cadwell can remember the land grab that erupted in 1942 as
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Fontana entered the “industrial epoch” – the queen of the newly independent industrial
west.302 For Davis, Fontana is a “model of a California warped by greed and
development.”303 Preceding these implications, Cadwell perceived Fontana as the model
of a balancing act between a Grapes of Wrath-esque orchard patch and mass consumer
industry.
Before NASCAR came to Fontana, another industry continued to prosper in the
city. Frankel Iron and Metal Company, founded in the mid-1950s in Fontana, profited
from the tearing down of the factory in the 1980s. Garbage companies, Fortune and The
New Yorker explain on recent profiles of the corporation, consolidated in the early 1990s
– leading to the incorporation of the small Frankel scrapyard in Fontana under a larger
conglomerate. However, in the late 1990s, Nathaniel Frankel, son of FIMCO’s founder,
was able to buy back a small yard in Fontana merge it with his company, American Steel
Recovery. Since then, Frankel’s business has succeeded as an example of how a 21rst
century American company can profitably tread the line between industrial and postindustrial. Frankel, in a unique move, began to use shipping containers to ship scrap
around the world. Southern Fontana, like most of the Inland Empires, serves as a holding
tank for Chinese goods imported to the United States. In exchange for these goods,
Frankel ships off scrap in near identical shipping containers to China and other parts
around the world where increased demand makes it profitable to sell scrap metal 5,000
miles away from its origin.304
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The Los Angeles Times was once full of stories on Fontana that covered plant
expansions, Kaiser’s refinancing, increasing population and jobs, and the importance of
Fontana as a industrial cornerstone of the regional economy. Now, for post-industrial
Fontana, it is found throughout the paper’s sports section when race results and the
spectacular crashes are relayed to the city and world.
Built atop almost 500 acres of the 1500 total that the steel mill occupied, the Auto
Club Speedway now hosts a NASCAR Sprint Cup event among various other races.
Before its construction, the remaining smelting furnaces were sold to steel plants in
China. “A symbol of U.S. strength [was] cut up and sent to China” in 1994, a year after
the Chinese economy grew by 13%.305 South of the tract there still exists some steel
manufacturing. However, it is owned by JFE, a Japanese holding company.306
Beginning in 1995 after 3,000 cubic yard of toxic dirt was removed, Kaiser
Ventures partnered with Penske Speedways, Inc. to begin constructing the track and
stadium. The project cost about $120 million dollars, just less than the original RFC
loan taken to finance the steel mill.307 The track, an oval with a circumference of 1.3
miles, was finished in June of 1997 – in time for the Winston Cup series race NASCAR
had promised to hold when construction began.308 Since then, the track has expanded by
25,000 to hold over 90,000 fans at a single event. Originally called California Speedway,
the Automobile Club of Southern California bought the naming rights in 2008.309
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In the end, the military industrial complex did not cause the demise and then
adaptation to a new sort of industry in Fontana. It was far more complicated than that –
international markets, production methods, and financiers not concerned with any sort of
defense spending were all involved. However, Fontana’s character, shaped by the
narrative of the plant and the ensuing outside-inside-outside characterizations of the city
from the Los Angeles metropolitan area, is a direct product of urban boosters partnering
with demand for defense products. Each side coalesced and aligned their various
arguments about industrialization, urbanization, and decentralization. Fontana was a very
real product, with its own problems, of this process.
Fontana once held a glamorous symbol of the American economy. However, as
the forces of the economy shifted in America, the steel mill became less glamorous. The
environmental movement targeted its pollution and its rising competitive costs infuriated
its owners – a far cry from the glory and modernism it instilled during its construction
and postwar golden age. To the working class of Fontana, the plant, while perhaps not as
illustrious, was still an important community fixture when it closed. Even America at
large recognized the loss as a sign of broader tragedy – a transformation of the economy
that would undermine the traditional American Dream. This process occurred in
Palmdale as well, but in a much more explicit context of the military industrial complex.
In Fontana, the boosters went back to work once again to redefine the community.
While once a focal point of the West’s industrial roadmap, Fontana now finds itself on
two other road maps. As a trucking hub and a stockcar racing destination, Fontana’s has
been able to prevent itself from falling off the map completely. Certainly, the community
has suffered distressed real estate and a loss of a strong commercial institution to
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underwrite the city and people’s prosperity. It still represents the edges of industrial and
urban decentralization in Los Angeles, from its days as a farming community, to
cherished industrial hub, to peripheral working class suburb. Whether the boosters of the
1920s would be proud is a confusing question. However, twenty first century Fontana is
not what Kaiser, FDR, A.B. Miller, Henry Arnold, General William J. Fox had in mind
after they helped sew lasting economic and military institutions into the Angeleno
economy before, during, and after World War II.
Conclusion
On the Edge of Progress: California City and the Limits of Decentralization
In 1958, Nathan Mendelsohn, just like the Air Force and Lockheed in Palmdale,
or A.B. Miller and then Henry Kaiser in Fontana, purchased a chunk of real estate in the
buffer zone between Los Angeles and the Cadillac Desert. Mendelsohn, a Columbia
Univeristy Sociology professor who self made himself into a real estate developer, had
even grander plans, though. He purchased 82,000 acres in Kern County. The massive
plot was 100 miles from Los Angeles in the barren Antelope valley, at a time when
Palmdale had yet to ferment its urban footprint.310 Whereas western San Bernardino, for
Kaiser and Company, was a growing agricultural country ripe for inclusion into the
ongoing urbanization and industrialization occurring Los Angeles County, Kern was, and
still is, firmly within the high desert. Still, following in the steps of Fontana, Paldmale,
and all of Los Angeles’s forefathers and boosters, Mendelsohn imagined a great
development, rampant urbanization, and a new flavor of the modern American utopia.
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Mendelsohn, though, did not see his community as just another extension of Los
Angles’ now regional sprawl. Named California City, Mendelsohn felt this would
become California’s next great “metropolis.”311 By some obscene imagination, the
Columbia professor misinterpreted the time period and thought California’s growth, in
population and industry, would continue at a great pace. Like the city planners, military
men, and boosters before him, Mendelsohn asked, where could all these newcomers find
a yard to call home and a job to pay the mortgage?312 A vigorous advertising campaign
was designed, the Los Angeles Times explained the motif: “California City, with its clean
air and mountain vistas, lay directly on the path of progress.”313
Many lots were sold in Mendelsohn’s city, more than a few site unseen by
speculators. Even in 1962, Mendelsohn wrote of the city’s progress, “Words alone can
only suggest what is occurring." Most of these lots remained empty, but some did move
to California City, swooned by Mendelsohn’s natural ability at sales, explained Jay
Sprague. Sprague moved there in 1965 to get away from the “congestion,” determined to
not raise his kids around “all that concrete in the big city. He remains there to this day.
The same cannot be said for Mendelsohn’s manmade lake, the centerpiece of a desert
iteration of New York’s Central Park. Today, an abandoned Holiday Inn lies on the
lake’s shores.314
Behind Los Angeles and San Diego, California city is the third largest city - by
land area. Today, 14,000 people live there. Geoff Manaugh, an architectural critic
fascinated with the failed utopia, wrote the people of California city live “Surrounded by
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a sprawling ghost-grid of empty streets scratched into the dust and gravel with nary a
finished house in sight.”315 The community’s largest employer, like Lancaster or
Palmdales, is Edwards Air Force Base, only 35 miles south.316 Honda operates a vehicle
test center, paralleling both the Japanese owned steel mill in today’s Fontana and the
importance of Edwards as a jet test site, a continuing testament to the geography of the
desert.317
Mendelsohn expected the “city” to become the next great Western metropolis,
both an “urban hub” and retirement destination – fusing Palm Springs with Fontana. He
“laid out roads and divided the desert into plots, many outfitted with water, electricity and
gas lines.”318 Today, there are over 185 square miles of dirt roads, planned out over fifty
years ago. Geoff Manuagh, an architectural critic, writes, “The uninhabited street plan
has become an abstract geoglyph—unintentional land art visible from airplanes—not a
thriving community at all.”319 The empty streets and plots are striking symbols of the
limits of urban decentralization. At some physical point, a point that Mendelsohn
discovered by accident, the metropolis cannot be synthesized without ample commercial
infrastructure –whether it by natural resources or a nearby urban economy of which it can
become a peripheral hub.
In many ways, it is a landscape that only makes sense from above. Intended as a
place of middle-class economic security, California City has become something
much more interesting—an optical training system for Air Force pilots and
skydivers, as well as an oddly beautiful example of misguided optimism.
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-Geoff Manaugh320

Ideas about urban dispersion and decentralization profoundly affected the
development of the Los Angeles’ early years. As Los Angeles grew even further and
defense related industries began to drive significant aspects of the economy during and
after World War II, the boosters and capitalists revised the ideas to accommodate new
fears about industrial centralization. Palmdale and Edwards Air Force Base resulted from
these new pairings, including a fear that consolidating aviation industry in the immediate
area around Los Angeles was threat to American national defense as a whole. Whereas
Glendale, Long Beach, and Pasadena had once been the periphery of Los Angeles, they
are now well within the city’s sprawl. The high desert in the Antelope valley was the
new geographic and industrial frontier for a key military base, municipal airport, and a
variety of aerospace factories.
Kaiser’s steel mill personified similar themes. Also not born entirely out of the
A portion of California City’s empty grid.
Geoof Manaugh, “Ghost Town: The Abandoned Suburb of California City,” GOOD, April 16,
2010. http://www.good.is/post/ghost-town-the-abandoned-suburb-of-california-city/

wartime period, demand for steel established by increase in production due to the war
accelerated the process of bringing a steel mill to the West. A symbol not just of
American wartime economic growth, but also Los Angeles’ continued imagined and real
struggle for urban and commercial autonomy. For Fontana, the effect was monumental
in transforming the agrarian community. Of equal magnitude was the negatives brought
on the town when the mill was shuttered forty years later. All are testaments to the
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tenuous relationship of industry and defense spending – especially when married under
the specter of Los Angeles boosterism.
California City is an American Pompeii – a ruin less than 75 years old that
captures, in a freeze frame of urbanization, the limits of California’s prosperity. Just like
with Fontana and Palmdale, capitalism is not to blame for the failures of California City.
Planned communities, industry, and cities falter in all sorts of economic markets.
Boosters promised California City’s original population, like Fontana and Palmdale’s, the
frontiers of the next wave of prosperity. In Fontana and Palmdale the promises made by
the local officials and boosters were not entirely empty. However, they depended on a
regional economic system in which defense industry was key. When broad changes to
the national economy, including the end of the Cold War and the rise of a post-Fordist
system, undermined the dependence on these industries, Fontana and Palmdale were
examples of the communities that bore the brunt of such transformations. Located on the
periphery of Los Angeles, defense industry underwrote Fontana and Palmdales’ inclusion
into the decentralized urban area. When that defense or manufacturing related industry
downsized, the communities were left to fend for themselves without the necessary
economic infrastructure needed to underwrite any city and too far from Los Angeles to
smoothly shrink into suburbs.
California City’s boosters, on the other hand, simply imagined their community as
a continuation of the urban sprawl. Thus, the community failed in an earlier stage of
development than Fontana and Palmdale. While the failure harmed the people who had
already purchased real estate in the “city,” it did not create the same systemic socio-
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economic problems that swept through Palmdale and Fontana in the 1990s and into the
present.
The original boosters, that saw such promise in their beginnings, are witnessing a
sad ending to their stories of Palmdale and Fontana. While Antelope Valley has lost the
luster that attracted thousands there, it continues to grow. Journalists like William
Finnegan paint a grim picture of the destruction the military industrial complex left
behind. In Fontana, the city’s residents and boosters turned to new industries that do not
provide the same sort of vibrant economy that the steel mill could. However, life goes on
in the desert cities – new boosters have taken up the empty posts. The idea of progress
has not left the communities. The socio-economic problems derived from the boosters’
fanciful notions of utopia limit the economic mobility and the futures of many residents
today, but that does not mean the communities are dying out. Fontana and Palmdale are
well enough established. Albeit the narratives behind their developments left them frail
and challenged, they still posses the urban spirit and institutions necessary for adaptation
to the continuing transformations of american capitalism. Even in California City, the
boosters will not allow the desert to swallow up Mendelsohn’s dream. While not
suburban homes, developer NextEra has partnered with utility conglomerate FPL Group
and California City officials to build dozens of solar farms on hundreds of thousands of
empty desert acres in the northern area of the city. The plan, still in its infancy, may
revive the area’s economy – shifting the focus from military industry to energy and
environmental issues.321 What will remain is the unwavering presence and power of the
local booster’s desire to bend and twist the capitalist system to benefit their home –
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adapting to whatever form America’s economy has taken at that moment. Whether the
adaptation results in prosperity or tragedy remains to be seen, but some of the answer can
be found in the mistakes and successes of Los Angeles’ past.
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